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Japanese animation, from here on referred to as anime, occupy an important and unique 
position in Japanese contemporary media. In my thesis, I will discuss and explore the 
following questions and current debates about anime as national Japanese product:  
- What is the importance of anime for the Japanese economy?  
- Has anime - as part of Japanese popular culture - become a soft power for Japan?  
- What is the cultural and national identity of anime?  
- Is anime a transnational product?  
Anime is the Japanese word for animation (brought to the screen, through series or film). 
Anime is also the term generally used worldwide to distinguish Japanese animation from 
Western animation. The term anime is also used to refer to anime as a certain recognisable 
style, sometimes regardless of its origin. Throughout this thesis the term anime is used 
specifically to identify Japanese animation, or animation (at least) involving Japanese 
cooperation. I will discuss anime as an international economic and cultural phenomenon and 
examine why anime is often more than just the moving images of Japanese pencil drawings. 
This thesis interrogates the position of anime as a cultural export and as a form of soft 
power and explores anime's current status within Japan’s (cultural) economy and 
international export markets. I discuss the relation of the Japanese economy to cultural 
popular products, with anime as a particular focus. My questions are as follows;  
- Why do we perceive anime as a Japanese cultural product and a (trans)national 
medium? On what scale (and is it still)?  
- To what extent is anime important as an actual asset for Japan’s soft power?  
- How does the Japanese government use anime (being a part of popular culture) and 
how does the economy benefit from it?   
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Chapter 1. Literature review and methodology  
Introduction 
The focus of my research is the relation between Japan's cultural economy, the national and 
cultural identity of anime and anime’s role as a form of soft power. The questions asked in 
my research are as follows:  
- What is soft power and what is its usefulness? 
- How does Japan use anime as a resource of soft power in practice? 
- What is the relation between anime as a cultural export products and Japan’s cultural 
and national Identity? 
- What are the national and transnational aspects in the creation of anime and how 
tangible is the ‘Japaneseness’ of anime?  
There is a substantial amount of existing work on anime and anime-related topics available, 
such as the debate about the national and transnational and anime as a part of popular 
culture. Many of these have different approaches, subjects, themes and sub-themes. In this 
literature review, I examine this existing work by comparing the most important findings 
from these authors. I am considering how these findings relate to my own research in which 
I am focussing on the 'economy' of anime; its current status within and outside Japan's 
export markets and the importance and meaning of anime's (cultural) identity. I have 
mapped out the major areas of debate, approaches, structured by approach and relevance 
to my own research. Due to the transnational aspects of anime (or rather, the fact that 
anime has become a transnational phenomenon), both Japanese and Western authors have 
focussed on anime as a research topic. Although I have used the work of Japanese authors 
whose work is available in English, the majority of the authors used in this literature review 
and this thesis are Western (European or American). Exploring the exact differences 
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between these authors and findings in a broad perspective is beyond the scope of this 
research. However, both Western and Japanese authors have made important contributions 
to understanding anime as a transnational phenomenon. 
 According to one of these Western authors, Thomas Lamarre in The Anime Machine 
(2009: xxi), live action film has dominated history and theories of the moving image, 
neglecting animation. However, in other countries too, there is a long tradition of animation. 
By 1988, already 40 percent of Japanese studio releases were animated (Napier 2005: 16-
17). In Japan, anime holds a significant and unique position: it has a powerful hold on 
Japanese culture, is often a representation of Japanese culture and dominates the film 
market in Japan, but at the same time is also now the most globally visible form of  
Japanese cinema. The question is, however, whether anime can represent Japan in the way 
live action cinema did. In recent years anime has not only become increasingly popular but 
has also gained a growing scholarly attention in Europe and the USA. The intellectually 
challenging themes and popularity of, for example, Princess Mononoke (Mononoke-Hime, 
dir: Hayao Miyazaki, Japan, 1997), along with other anime films, has stimulated the writing 
of scholarly articles about these works and about anime in general. By the 1990s, anime 
gained recognition as a Japanese cultural product that is worthy of intellectual study (Napier 
2005: 18). 
 One of the purposes of this thesis is to research the position of anime as a ‘soft 
power’ and its current status within Japan’s (cultural) economy. In terms of Gross Domestic 
Product, Japan is the third largest economy in the world after the United States and China.1 
Even though the economy is no longer growing as rapidly since the economic bubble burst 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s,  it is still growing. According to The Japan Times, 
                                                             
1 GDP stands for the market value of goods and services within a country. A rising GDP indicates a higher 
standard of living, the lower the GDP is, the lower the standard of living is in a country. 
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economists expect a growth of 1.3 percent by March 2020 (published December 18th, 
2018). However, industries in Japan such as retailing and agriculture have been facing 
difficulties. The Japanese media sector is huge and at a somewhat more stable point but 
was declining in 2013 when it came to sales. The Japanese music industry, for example, is 
still the second largest music market in the world whilst continuing to be dominated by 
Japanese artists (Anon. 2018). Anime and manga occupy a strong position in Japan’s 
economy as media export markets and naturally, part of Japan’s cultural economy. But even 
though the economic position of popular Japanese content is big and immensely popular, 
anime creators in Japan have been struggling with a decline in sales of media due to the 
increase of free content via video sharing sites. A report from 2017 from The Association of 
Japanese Animations shows that the total value of the anime industry had a market value of 
17.5 billion U.S. Dollars in 2016, growing compared to previous years.2 These sales have 
mostly derived from overseas markets which have grown 171.9% since 2013 reaching a 
record of 7.154 billion dollars in 2016. With numbers like these, it is no surprise that anime 
seems a logical choice as a form of soft power.  
  Many scholars have attempted to explain or point out the 'beginning' of anime.3 It 
seems it is something that is hard to determine. The first Japanese animated film was Tale 
of the White Serpent (Hakujaden, dir: Taiji Yabushita, Japan, 1958) that was produced by 
Tōei animation studios. Some scholars (like myself) mark the true start of anime (or to be 
more specific, the start of the anime 'hype') with the series of Astro-boy  (Tetsuwan Atomu, 
dir: Osama Tezuka, Japan, 1963-1966 [first series]) whilst others look at anime that was 
already produced from the early 1900s. Rayna Denison points out that 'anime' has not 
always been the term used and in some cases has been applied retroactively. According to 
                                                             
2 See http://aja.gr.jp/english/japan-anime-data for the full report. 
3 The cultural background of anime shares a common heritage with manga, which often creates a confusion 
between the two terms. Manga is the Japanese word for comic and thus means the drawing of a story on paper. 
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Denison, the 'rise' of anime within Japan’s animation culture is a demonstration of the power 
of Japanese anime industries and (sub)cultural gatekeepers around the world, to control 
how anime is understood (and thus, what we perceive as being anime). She comes to the 
conclusion that the term anime, as we know it now, is a relatively new term that has often 
been applied to the whole history of cell animation (Denison 2015: 5). As Denison points 
out, too, it becomes hard to determine what anime exactly is, as there are many different 
views of what should be considered anime, and what should not: there are a variety of 
types of media hidden under the rubric anime and (academic) books on anime refer to 
various sources of media al identified as being anime, too (ibid: 6). It remains unclear 
whether it is the artistic style that constitutes anime or its Japanese ‘roots’. The term anime 
merely means ‘animation’ in Japanese, so when does anime become something more 
specific than just the Japanese word for animation? One might suggest that what we now 
consider anime in the West can be categorized as a certain style and certain genres and 
sub-genres within that style, which for a huge part is the result of anime becoming a global 
brand in the 80s. It is debatable where, how, and when anime was developed, and what 
precisely ‘anime’ has come to mean. Looking back at shorts from the 1920s, it is obvious 
that the style of the cartoons is very different from what we now consider anime. Given the 
variety of discussions about the origins of anime, it is understandable that some scholars 
choose to go back centuries,4 to the ancient art of Japanese drawing: the Japanese have 
been telling stories by pictures for centuries, which in modern times translated themselves 
into manga, Japanese comic books, and anime. Though many scholars look at the history of 
anime, some in greater detail than others, it is noticeable  that a major focus point lies on 
post-war Japan and contemporary Japan. This suggests that it is more illuminating to focus 
not on the start of anime as being born as an ‘art form’, but rather on the cultural identity of 
                                                             




anime and why anime as a product is economically important for Japan. Furthermore, anime 
has become a global phenomenon as a result of international distribution and exhibition 
markets, but many anime productions are influenced by the Japanese culture and national 
identity. Taking this into consideration, the majority of existing scholarly research does not 
(only) focus on the history or artistic scenery of anime, but also on the cultural aspects of 
anime and the reception of anime in the West. Furthermore, there are scholars who focus 
on the visual aspects of anime. Brian Ruh (2008: 139-144), for example, has a specific take 
on Robots in Japanese culture and 'mecha' anime.5 Another important point of discussion is 
how the Japanese government has been attempting to boost the visibility of their cultural 
identity by using cultural economics and using this as a soft power. In my research, I too 
will focus on how anime is perceived as a (trans)national medium, but in addition will 
explore how this positions anime as a global and commercialised product within the 
Japanese economy and Japan's foreign export markets. 
Cultural and national identity 
In this thesis I refer to both cultural and national identity. It is therefore illuminating to 
explain the difference between the two terms. Cultural identity refers to a person’s (self- 
identified) background or 'sense of self' in a broad range: it can consist of someone's 
national background, but can also consist of (but is not limited to), someone’s religion, social 
                                                             
5 Robots are an important part of the Japanese culture, not only in how they are represented in anime but also in 
the Japanese society. With technology in Japan being very developed, it is no wonder that robotics are very 
much Japanese and have become a part of Japanese culture. When watching a Western based anime such as 
Trigun (Toraigan, dir: Satoshi Nishimura, Japan, 1998) or any other anime on the popular topic of Bounty 
Hunters, Robots or Mechanica (referred to as Mecha within the anime-genre) are often involved. As Ruh 
describes, Robots and Japan are often perceived as being linked in mainstream analyses of Japanese popular 
Culture (2008:144). Ruh describes Astro Boy’s popularity as one of the first robot-themed manga’s and later on, 
anime series (Ruh 2008: 139-145). 
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group, social class, age(group) or ethnicity (Amiot, Doucerain, Zhou & Ryder 2018: 629). 
These are all ingredients of the self-conception of a person, or, a group of people who share 
this same background; it is the identity that someone feels represents them as a person 
(2018: 629). Cultural identity is also an identity that develops and changes. For example, 
when someone joins a new social group or migrates and over time identifies with this new 
social group (ibid). National identity refers more specifically to where someone is 
geographically from, or, the geographical nation or region a person feels it belongs to, 
regardless of whether or not this person holds a citizenship in that country or region. In 
other words, it is the specific geographical place people describe themselves to 'come from' 
(Huddy 2016: 39). Part of this nation, can be a shared culture, shared traditions and a 
shared language. National 'attachment' can lead to patriotism: having an emotional 
attachment to national symbols, holding a certain pride, respect, allegiance to- or love for 
the nation (ibid). It can also lead to nationalism, which is typically defined, in a more 
negative sense, as the feeling of being superior to- or dominating other nations (2016: 40). 
Problem statement 
Research on the Japanese economy, recession and the lost decades is widely available. 
Research in anime studies received scholarly attention at a later stage, but anime too has 
become the subject of scholarly discussion. Until a few years ago, the subjects have often 
been treated as two different fields of study; Culture and Media studies and/or Film and TV 
Studies, and Economics. However, as is the case with, for example, Hollywood, which has 
been looked at from an economic perspective by many scholars. For example, by David 
Desser in Hollywood goes shopping (2000) and by Aida Hozic in Hollyworld: Space, Power, 
and Fantasy in the American Economy (2001).  The developments in the past years have 
removed these boundaries, and anime and the Japanese economy are now, arguably,  one 
intertwined topic of discussion. Going back to the past, the Japanese government, as well as 
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scholars and economists, have focussed on the obvious export markets (the automotive 
industry, technology, agriculture etc.). I argue that approaching the Japanese economy from 
this perspective only is now outdated as these sectors and industries have long been 
surpassed by other industries, in which anime plays an important role. The question is, 
however, whether anime can really surpass these industries on which the Japanese 
economy once thrived. The economic value of popular culture (and therefore anime) has 
now been recognised by the Japanese government and the economic changes are being 
dealt with. With this thesis I am bringing the economic dimension into the discussion of 
anime, both as part of Japan's popular culture and as a form of soft power.  
 Over the past years, anime has received a certain status and a large number of 
Westerners are nowadays familiar with the medium. It is no longer a minority medium that 
spectators in the west are unfamiliar with, but still isn't as mainstream as other forms of 
media either: so far, only Studio Ghibli films consistently get theatrical releases in most 
Western countries. Hayao Miyazaki's work in the 90s, movies such as Ghost in the Shell 
(Gōsuto in za sheru / Kōkaku kidōtai, dir: Mamoru Oshii, Japan, 1995) and series such as 
Dragonball Z (Doragon Bōru Zetto, dir: Daisuke Nishio, Japan, 1989) contributed greatly 
towards a growing popularity and interest in anime from the 90s onwards. Anime is a known 
medium, but on a side note it is true that a lot of anime is still aimed primarily at a Japanese 
audience, with little emphasis on attracting international audiences. It is in these cases that 
anime could be misunderstood due to cultural differences or because spectators are 
unfamiliar with Japanese customs and tradition (and not because they are unfamiliar with 
anime as a medium), thus I approach this from a cultural and transnational perspective. I 
focus on the cultural and (trans)national identity of anime and will approach these topics by 
looking at cultural and (trans)national perspectives, the importance of the cultural and the 
(trans)national for the Japanese economy and national and international export markets in 
relation to political relationships and image building. 
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Existing research   
There is a great variety of anime research available focussing on different aspects of anime. 
For example, scholar Thomas Lamarre mainly focuses on visual aspects of anime and 
making anime a visually ‘understandable’ media (Lamarre 2009). Foremost he focuses on 
the unique technical aspects of anime and the visual identity that makes anime stand out so 
much from other forms of media. He expands some topics raised in less detail by other 
scholars, such as the use of technology, colour and image that are all compelling features of 
anime. Lamarre approaches anime as an art form and very specifically discusses the visual 
and technological aspects of anime and the production process of anime. One of the topics 
he discusses is the fact that much anime is still produced as what we now see as limited or 
low tech animation: often still drawn by hand and therefore according to Lamarre, the feel 
and look of it is what attracts us to anime and what makes it ‘anime’ (2009: 11). In a 
broader sense, I cannot completely agree with Lamarre, as there are various other forms of 
artistic styles that are considered anime too by spectators as well as scholars. For example, 
the film Final Fantasy: The Spirits Within (Dir. Hironobu Sakaguchi, USA, 2001) and Final 
Fantasy VII: Advent Children (Dir. Tetsuya Nomura, Japan, 2005), both of which are based 
on the computer games and earlier anime series, are often labelled as being anime as well, 
even though in a sense, many Western fans might argue they are not 'really' anime because 
of the 3D computer techniques that have been used. The statement of anime being 
recognisable and attractive because of 'low tech animation' has become outdated, as many 
Japanese artists nowadays use the same (computerized) and new techniques as, for 
example, their American counterparts. However, I would argue that the artistic style of 
anime shares a common 'racelesness'. Characters share common recognisable 'anime 
characteristics' or features that we have come to recognise as anime. There is no 
recognisable ethnic background and characters (though we recognise them as 'humans') do 
not have recognisable ethnic features that can be compared to any cultural background: big 
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eyed, smooth faced, all different but more or less similar: these are, in a sense, also 
unspecific 'features' at the same time, when referring to them as existing human cultural 
(facial) features. This argument runs counter with Susan Napier's explanation of 
statelessness in anime (Napier 2001: 24-25). Napier notes that characters in anime do not 
look Japanese, but rather participate in a 'non-culturally specific anime style' (2001: 24). 
According to Napier, anime has often been described by Japanese commentators with the 
word mukokuseki, which means "stateless" or without a national identity (ibid). Napier 
describes the statelessness of anime characters by looking at the mukokuseki quality in the 
non-Japanese depiction of human characters in anime, which is often considered 'anime 
style' (2001: 25). Mukokuseki, or statelessness, in anime can also offer a world that is not 
necessarily Japanese, but rather a world on its own. Anime can in that sense completely 
'diverge from Japanese cultural products' (ibid). However, I argue that even though 
characters can be stateless, it is still possible for anime (in context, themes and scenery) to 
be culturally specific. Such as is the case with some specific works of Hayao Miyazaki, as I 
discuss in this thesis. Napier recognises this point, too, but also point outs that the anime 
world is a 'realm' that exists in 'counterpoint to the world of modern Japan'. Suggesting that 
being a 'flexible' and nonconforming medium' is what might enhance anime's attractiveness 
to the Japanese as well as foreign audiences (2001: 26).  
 Scholar Tze-Yue G. Hu describes anime as 'one of the most contemporary crystallized 
ornaments of an ever-visual growing Japan' and compares anime in general to one of its 
American counterparts, Walt Disney Studios (Hu 2010: 46-47). According to Hu, Disney 
relies on a European heritage for literary inspiration and graphic representation, whilst the 
Japanese are often inspired by Shintoism, indigenous Japanese folk symbols, folk systems, 
Japanese beliefs, customs, thoughts and practices (ibid. 2010). Anime is considered to be 
just as flexible as any other artistic medium in Japan. Within anime all possible genres can 
be found, appealing to all age groups (Hoff Kraemer 2004: 1). 
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 A number of scholars have focussed on anime’s national and cultural identity, and 
how Japan as a country 'stands out'. Suzanne Napier, for example, points out that the 
Japanese society is unique not only due its distinctive culture, but also because as a non- 
Western society Japan has successfully industrialised their economy (Napier 2001: 27). As a 
matter of fact, Japan’s modern history is unusual in Asia. In the first half of the 20th 
century, it was the only Asian country to achieve advanced industrial status (Hein 2008: 1). 
Napier explains: 
 It (Japan) is also a society that, in ways both positive and negative, is almost larger 
 than life. The positive is deeply impressive. Not only was Japan the first non-Western 
 nation to modernise successfully, but also it succeeded so well that, during the 1960s 
 and 70s, it became a model for other developing nations. [...] the standard of living 
 is high, the citizenry is exceptionally well educated, and 90 percent of Japanese 
 consider themselves "middle class". Its arts [...] are renowned around the world 
 (2001: 27-28). 
In a more negative sense, Napier refers to Japan's economic recession, the atomic 
bombings, the wartime history with America and Japan's relationship with neighbouring 
Asian Countries, a relationship that is still relevant today (ibid).  
 As an article in Foreign Policy suggest, many aspects of Japan's culture originate 
from China (Pilling 2014). Such as written scripts, Confucian hierarchy and Buddhism (which 
arrived in Japan through China, but originated in India). In the 19th century, Japan 
embraced Western civilisation, and literature and philosophy held a place in Japanese 
culture, too (ibid). It was also the time when Japan politically exercised nation building and 
established Japan's credentials as a standalone culture (ibid). Following on from that, Koichi 
Iwabuchi  argues that national identity is never naturally given but is carefully constructed 
(Iwabuchi 2002: 51). He sees Japan as a hybrid culture but also discusses the discourse of 
11 
 
Nihonjinron, "theory (about the essence) of Japaneseness" which is a set of discourses (or 
rather, a genre of writing) aimed on affirming Japan’s uniqueness and 'Japaneseness' (Ko 
2010: 12). The genre in essence aims to explain and explore Japan's 'great' homogeneous 
cultural and national identity (Burgess 2014). The development of Nihonjinron dates back to 
the Tokugawa Era (Edo period, 1603 - 1868) but flourished again in the post-World War II 
period (Pilling 2014). However, these text are extremely nationalist in their context. For 
example, it describes the Japanese as having 'a unique sensitivity to nature, an ability to 
communicate without language through a sort of social telepathy, and a rarefied artistic  
awareness' (Pilling 2014). These Nihonjinron texts have been multiplied and spread by 
Japanese (and in some cases Western) authors post-World War II and have served as 
propaganda for Japan's 'uniqueness', as well as its self perception as a country (ibid).  
 Iwabuchi’s findings (that include seeing Japan as a Hybrid culture (2002: 51), can be 
compared with and translated into the effect that America has on the West; we are highly 
influenced by American popular culture and media. Music, film and television series shown 
and available in many European countries are more likely to be American than European. He 
presents a similar image of Japan’s position in these markets in East and Southeast Asia 
since the late 1970s and he points out that media globalization offers an opportunity to 
expand Japanese media productions to other Asian countries, which has recently been the 
case. Another widely known author on anime, Susan Napier, examines anime and its cultural 
context and as an art form and researches its role in the United States (Napier 2007). Napier 
continuously investigates anime’s role in the West and compares anime in Japan with how 
anime is seen by the Western and specifically American audiences. Napier refers to the term  
‘Japonisme’. Until around the 1870s-1880s, Japan was a private society that did not have 
much contact with the West. After this period, the Japanese expanded their export markets 
and the West became an important export market for cultural artefacts. Japanese art and 
culture became popular in the West: this period is what historians still refer to as the period 
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of ‘Japonisme’, the hype of everything Japanese in the West starting in the late 19th century 
(Napier 2007: 125). Napier argues that along with the growing interest in anime, a new sort 
of Japonisme has been developed: 
By the 1990s, Japan’s influence on popular culture worldwide would come in many 
forms including music, fashion and horror movies.[...] Anime and manga and the fan 
culture that they engendered have had the most penetrating impact on a global 
cultural scale (Napier 2007: 125). 
Napier points out that one of the most important reasons for the popularity of anime 
worldwide is the past economic growth of Japan, which stimulated both the appreciation 
and resentment of Japan by the West (2007: 127-128). The same has been pointed out by 
scholar Darrel Hamamoto, who states that the acceptance of anime, among other products 
of popular culture, has been a huge part of the acceptance and appreciation of all things 
Asian (Hamamoto 2000: 11). In the past this has not always been the case. Since the 1960s 
Asian films have been confronted by 'anti-yellow' racism as Hamamoto points out. In 
response, this 'struggle' against white racism has resulted into a central theme that has 
often been used throughout the past in independent Asian-American film. In current times 
however, this has taken a positive turn and instead there is a fetishization of Asian popular 
culture which Hamamoto refers to as 'Asiaphilia' (2000: 11). He points out that: 
 Whilst the 'Orientalist' discourse in cinema once helped mobilize and sustain support 
 for the U.S. and European imperium in the Near East and Asia, Asiaphilia is a 
 deceptively benign ideological construct that naturalizes and justifies the systematic 
 appropriation of cultural property and expressive forms created by Yellow people 
 (Hamamoto 2000: 12). 
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The use of (historical) culture in popular film and media (or, in the 'post industrial' 
information economy, as Hamamoto suggests) has become economically interesting and has 
been converted into corporate wealth, (ibid. 2000). Secondly, subjects such as war 
tragedies, refugees and racism are not ignored but rather used and recognised in modern 
Asian (and thus Japanese) film (2000: 13). In the case of Japan, economic growth came 
with  the popularity of Japanese products, toys, films, and food, such as Hello Kitty, 
Pokémon, and sushi. In terms of Napier's 'Japonisme', there is of course more to the 
Japanese ‘invading the West’ than just anime and sushi. Japan’s economy indeed grew 
rapidly since the 1960s. And unlike the Japonisme that occurred in the late 1800s, in the 
present time the Japanese export market offers quality and highly advanced technological 
products. Napier seeks an explanation as to why we came to accept Japan in terms of an 
export market and a popular culture. This begs the question of why it is that anime has 
created a subculture of fandom in the West. As Napier points out (2007: 127-128), the 
United States in particular has a long tradition of cartoons from giant production companies 
such as Walt Disney Studios and Warner Brothers. She refers to the growing acceptance of 
the fantasy genre in the West, a factor that might have also paved the way for anime, but 
does not discuss further whether the long tradition of American cartoons has also helped 
anime to be a more accepted genre in the United States (Napier 2007: 128).  In closer 
connection with my own research, Napier discusses the role of Japanese culture within 
anime and the role of anime itself within the Japanese society and considers whether anime 
can be seen as a product of national Identity. She sees anime as in some way a ‘stateless’ 
art form rather than being influenced by the West or by its own Japanese culture (2007: 
128), but at the same time she is mindful of the complexities of researching anime in 
relation to the context of Japanese cultural identity (2005: 27). Napier describes how the 
Japanese have competed with America on various assets including anime since the 1990s 
(2007: 90). She starts with the Japanese technological and automobile industries that 
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became, and still are, successful in America since the 70s and were even seen as a threat by 
many Americans. The difference is that we can define (technological) products as 'raceless' 
whilst anime has set its mark as a recognisable Japanese image. Also, anime has had 
noticeably more success abroad in recent years than Japanese live action cinema. 
 The subject of 'racelessnes' mentioned earlier is also addressed by Rayna Denison in 
Anime: A Critical Introduction (2015). She points out that the so-called 'Japaneseness' of 
anime, and the way that scholars such as Iwabuchi, Napier, and Eji Otsuka look at it, has in 
common a level of concern about the 'right' way for anime to represent Japanese culture 
abroad. Denison points out that anime, in many discussions, becomes 'burdened' by the 
weight of national representation even if anime is no longer recognisably Japanese (2016: 
10). Anime is considered a Japanese cultural product by many scholars, but most anime 
productions and the characters involved don't show any physical signs of Japaneseness. On 
the other hand, as pointed out by Denison, many scholars focus on the cultural contexts of 
anime by researching the 'deeper' cultural meaning, cultural specificity and nationalism 
within anime (2015: 11). What is clear is that the cultural identity of anime is not a 
standalone topic now that anime has been officially recognised as a soft power. Just like 
Hollywood films, it holds a huge economic weight when it comes to anime as an industry. 
The Japanese government chooses to push anime as a Japanese cultural product and a 
welcome card, invitation to visit, cooperate, invest in and especially, appreciate Japan and 
what it has to offer. Anime is an economic asset, but in a broader sense, it is also a highly 
influential cultural and transnational product.  
Anime as a (trans)national product 
With so many different aspects of what anime is and whether or not anime is a cultural 
phenomenon, it is important to firstly look at what 'transnational' and 'national cinema 
exactly mean. Stephen Croft suggests that there are seven different types of national 
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cinema: two of them are significant varieties in which anime can be distinguished within the 
field of national cinema. These varieties are firstly, the cinema that completely ignores 
Hollywood and secondly, national cinemas whose culture and language take their distance 
from the nation states which enclose them (Crofts 2006: 45). In the case of anime, both 
situations can be found: anime can often be seen as an homogenous product that does not 
necessarily conform to 'Hollywood' standards. Furthermore, anime is firstly a product of 
Japanese origin, often influenced by the Japanese culture and originally spoken in the 
Japanese language.  
 Mette Hjort interrogates the term transnationalism in her essay ‘On the plurality of 
cinematic Transnationalism’ (Hjort 2010), arguing that it is often used based on certain 
assumptions (one being that the transnational is always a good thing), rather than explicit 
definitions (2010: 13). Hjort’s most important point is that there are degrees of 
transnationality and scholars need to be clear about which one they are talking about. For 
example, Hjort points out that there are stronger and weaker forms or transnationality 
depending on all the elements involved that make media transnational (such as production, 
distribution, reception). She also believes that there should be a distinction made between 
'marked' and 'unmarked' transnationality; for example, when producers intentionally try to 
make their product transnational or encourage the audiences to think about the production 
in a transnational way (2010: 13). There can also be productions that are made with a 
national audience in mind, but are set in a transnational framework. And of course, a media 
production can become transnational (for example, when it becomes popular among 
international spectators and available internationally, after all), even if this was not the 
original intention for it. (2010: 14). 
When looking at anime, various examples of 'marked' and 'unmarked' transnational 
productions can be found. For example, even if by only looking at Studio Ghibli's work, many 
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(trans)national intentions can be found, too. Some productions, such as, for example, 
Arrietty (Kari-gurashi no Arietti, dir: Hiromasa Yonebayashi, 2010, Japan) have been 
produced for an international audience and were meant to be transnational productions, 
whilst other (early) productions, such as  My Neighbour Totoro (Tonari no Totoro, dir: 
Hayao Miyazaki, 1988, Japan),6 were originally focussed on a national audience and became 
transnational at a later stage. I agree with Mette Hjort that the term 'transnational film' has 
become a term that has been used in multiple contexts by various scholars over the past 
years. In that context, Hjort states that what is needed is a 'detailed typology' that links the 
concept of transnationalism to different models of cinematic production (2010: 15). 
According to Hjort, the more valuable forms of cinematic transnationalism feature two 
qualities, one being 'a resistance to globalisation as cultural homogenization' and the second 
being 'a commitment to ensuring that certain economic realities (associated with 
filmmaking) do not eclipse the pursuit of aesthetic, artistic, social, and political values' (Hjort 
2010: 15). With the above in mind, Hjort explains and divides transnationalism into nine 
types of transnationalism, of which a few are relevant in consideration for own research. For 
example, according to Hjort, ‘Ephiphanic transnationalism’ brings the spectator a shared 
culture that may not be recognized as such by the audience, but in fact may resemble a 
deep national belonging whilst at the same time it overlaps with the aspects of other 
national identities - for example, a 'Nordic' production being a Swedish/ Danish cooperation 
or a 'Benelux' production being a Belgium and Dutch cooperation, and so on. This can  
result from cooperation for economic and cultural reasons, to pull common resources, to 
share shared interests, culture, identity, heritage or history, and/ or to make spectators 
aware of the issue of the transnational (2010: 16-17), which can be the case with 
international Japanese co-productions. For example, on May 9th, 2018 an agreement was 
                                                             




signed between China and Japan to ʺfortify exchange of film-making associations between 
Japan and China and to expand efforts for co-production of films between themʺ. 
Expectations of this agreement are that it will contribute to promoting ʺmutual 
understanding between people in Japan and China by providing them with greater 
opportunities to enjoy jointly-produced filmsʺ.7 The cross- border film Wish You Were Here 
(dir: Kenneth Bi, 2018, China/Japan)   was the first film that was produced after signing the 
China-Japan film co-production treaty, involving both a Chinese actress and a Japanese 
actor who in the film are falling in love and experiencing cultural differences and finding out 
together how to deal with these differences.  
‘Affinitive’ transnationalism centres on 'the tendency to communicate with those 
similar to us' (2010: 17). In other words, it can be based on cultural similarities, but can also 
arise from shared problems or commitments as is the case, too, with Wish You Were Here. 
Relevant in the case of anime and Japan’s ‘Cool Japan’ scheme, which I will talk about in 
this thesis, is also ‘opportunistic transnationalism’. It involves, according to Hjort, 'giving 
priority to economic issues, to the point where monetary factors actually dictate the 
selection of partners beyond national borders' and is about 'responding to available 
economic opportunities' (2010: 19). Examples of opportunistic transnationalism are anime 
productions that have been produced in co-production with foreign studios. Often not 
considered anime, but certainly an early example, is the Transformers series running in the 
80s and 90s (which were initially produced and often perceived as American, but in fact this 
already was an early co-production by using Japanese artists). This applied not only to 
Transformers at that time, but also the commonly known 80s series Dungeons and Dragons 
(dir: Bob Richardson/ Karl Geurs, 1983-1985), a co-production between the Japanese Toei 
Animation studios and the American Marvel Productions. More recently, Afro Samurai: 
Resurrection (dir. Fuminori Kizaki, 2009) has been produced. Targeted at an international 
                                                             
7 As described on the METI website (Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry). 
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audience it was produced in co-production with (among others) Samuel L. Jackson, by the 
Japanese Studio Gonzo and originally aired in English on the American television channel 
Spike.  A lesser-known example of a French-Japanese co-production is the French-Canadian 
produced anime series Urban (dir. Joel Dos Reis Viegas, 2014), which has been produced by 
studio Yapiko Animation, an animation studio that works both in France and Japan, with 
both French and Japanese animation staff.  
‘Cosmopolitan transnationalism’ applies to many anime productions as well; it is a 
description of productions that, on some level, reflect the movement of their director and 
include a mix of national, transnational or sometimes even postcolonial commitments (2010: 
21). It can also been referred to as ‘accented’ cinema - cinema where the cultural 
background of its director is highly noticeable, which is often the case in, for example, 
Hayao Miyazaki’s and Isao Takahata’s work. Therefore, even if anime as a medium is 
sometimes 'stateless', as has often been discussed by scholars (Denison 2018:10), it can still 
be 'accented'. According to scholar Hamid Naficy (2010: 11), accented filmmakers are 
products of a 'postcolonial and post-Soviet displacement and postmodern scatterings'. Naficy 
explains that as a result of their displacement, they have become subjects in world history 
by making films that distance themselves from the 'mainstream'. They might not have the 
same resources as Hollywood productions to begin with, but still manage to become large 
independently, such as is the case with (early) anime, becoming an 'engine for creating 
transnational media cultures and national identities'. As Naficy states, accented films and/or 
filmmakers can become a homogeneous group or movement. He writes:   
While their films include these tensions and differences, they are not neatly 
 resolved by familiar narrative or generic schema. Nevertheless, their films do 
 share certain common stylistic attributes in terms of patterns, uses of mise-en-scène, 
 filming, narration, themes, characters and structures of feeling. These common 
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 attributes also contribute to the accent, which signifies de-territorialization at the 
 same time as it serves to re-territorialize them as film-making authors (2010: 11).  
 
Going back to Mette Hjort’s essay, as Japan is trying to strengthen economic and cultural 
relationships by using 'accented cinema', anime and popular media and gaining international 
recognition for its culture, her term ‘Modernizing transnationalism’ is also applicable to 
anime in particular. ‘Modernizing transnationalism’ refers to a medium that is used for the 
above purposes. Hjort uses the example of Hong Kong’s government who have been 
attempting (since early 2000s) to boost the visibility, recognition and ‘branding’ of Hong 
Kong as a first-class city.. In cinema ‘modernizing’ transnationalism is a mix of ‘cutting edge’ 
cinematic practice, transnational in essence, 'with a concept of culture as a recourse for 
modernization and recognition' (2010: 25).  What is clear is that the term ‘transnationalism’ 
is not a term to be ‘just’ applied to any film production that has been produced beyond its 
national boundaries or with a strong cultural accent. It is a term to be looked at with more 
depth and that comes, according to Hjort, in different forms for which the ones mentioned 
above are a good guideline. When it comes to anime, various types of Hjort’s 
transnationalism can be applicable.  
Soft power in relation to anime and Japan's (cultural) economy 
In 2002, an article written by Douglas McGray called ‘Japan's Gross National Cool’ (2002 44-
54) was published that had a major impact on the decision to expand Japan’s 'soft power'. 
McGray pointed out that the Japanese cultural sway in 2001 was not like that of American 
culture abroad. However, he claimed that Japan had been perfecting the art of transmitting 
certain kinds of mass culture, but suggested that the Japanese government had not fully 
been looking (at that time) at Japan’s cultural potential. The modern Japanese seemed to be 
interested and more inspired by ‘what is foreign’. McGray argued that it was surprising how 
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little 'Japan' there was in modern Japan and that there was very little interest from foreign 
audiences in the Japanese culture abroad. It made the Japanese government realise that 
consumption could be deeply cultural and, in order to gain economic profit from this, the 
cultural economy needed to be stimulated; a perspective expressed by studies of economists 
that have examined the opportunities of focussing more on the culturalization of the 
economy (Kelts 2013). McGray claimed that a cultural superpower needs a healthy economic 
base, but not necessarily a healthy economy. The cultural industry in Japan was one that 
even with ongoing economic issues had not been sitting still at the time. As McGray himself 
argued, 'Japan’s growing cultural presence has created a mighty engine of national cool'. He 
describes ‘the national cool’ as a soft power, and points out that this national cool can be 
used to serve political and economic ends'with the cultural reach of  a superpower already in 
place, it’s hard to imagine that Japan will be content to remain so much medium and so little 
message' (2002: 54).  It was clearly a message received by the Japanese government, but 
the stage at which they decided to take definite action might have been rather late as these 
industries had peaked already. However, politics are now involved in cultural popular 
content. If Japan’s culture will be up-scaled for a foreign audience, can it still be perceived 
as a truly independent Japanese product? Cultural economy in this case is not only the 
‘economies’ of anime, but also the politics of anime. When hard power is no longer today’s 
effective tool, it is soft power that is to be trusted when seeking to gain economic profit and 
establish political relationships. Japanese popular cultural content was already growing to be 
a soft power even before the government was involved to make this soft power more 
powerful. Now that politics are involved, can this development still be seen as a friendly way 
to get other countries to do what they want them to do, or is it just a desperate strategy to 
boost Japan’s economy? And maybe even a modern form of manipulation?  
 In 1990 Joseph S. Nye Junior introduced the term and concept of ‘soft power’. The 
term is a response to how, during recent decades, the nature of political and economic 
21 
 
power has been changing. Hard power can, for example, be military or economic actions 
that can get another country to change their position. Soft power is an indirect way for a 
country to get what they want, and to get others to want the same thing that they want 
(Nye 2004: 11). Nye describes soft power as simply an attraction; there are no commands, 
nor is any force involved, it is a way to create something friendly and attractive that makes 
others want to be involved. In 2012 Joseph Nye stated in The Wall Street Journal that when 
it comes to soft power, 'the best propaganda is in not propaganda' (Nye, 2012), meaning 
that working on your credibility as a country is more important. According to Nye, the soft 
power of a country is dependent on three sources: its culture, its political values and its 
foreign policies (2004: 11). To understand better what ‘soft power’ is in an Asian context, it 
is interesting to first look at an example of where soft power has flourished and has been, 
and still is, a great economic force. Naturally the first example (compared to Japan) that 
comes to mind is China. Both Japan and China established foreign and economic policies in 
order to ‘push’ their economy to a higher level. According to scholars Hongyi Lai and Yiyi Lu, 
China became the world’s largest exporter in 2009 (2012: 1). Their book China's Soft Power 
and International Relations (2012) gives a thorough explanation about China as a global 
economic (soft) power. Most academics approach China’s soft power from Joseph Nye’s 
perspective. Lai and Lu argue that Chinese soft power mainly has been manifested in to two 
aspects, one being China’s foreign policy and international ‘behaviour’ and the other being 
the external influence of the Chinese model on the ‘developing’ world (2012: 21). One of the 
major tools for China to use its soft power in recent years is the unique Chinese culture. 
China has been creating opportunities and utilizing platforms for cultural exchange and has 
been actively promoting programs supporting the visibility of its culture, all with the aim to 
enhance China’s soft power and portray China’s ‘peaceful’ rise. China has been working on 
its cultural diplomacy and has been polishing its image worldwide. However, China’s soft 
power scheme is still limited by its economic recourses and, according to Lai, the defects in 
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its political system (2012: 83). Some governments (the United States and Japan in 
particular) are concerned by China’s role and rivalry in the Asia Pacific and their negative 
human rights record. Many countries even see China (and the economic and military force of 
China) as a threat to the rest of the world: China’s soft power is often seen as a ‘bad’ soft 
power. China, however, chooses to ease the discomfort by enhancing their image around 
the world, or as Lai states, the negative lesson also reminded the Chinese elites of the 
importance of soft power for 'cultivating a favourable image of China'. In the early 2000s 
China chose to enhance its worldwide image as a 'beautiful, peaceful and harmonious 
country [...] Demonstrating the virtues of the Chinese path of economic development; 
expanding its foreign assistance; and developing its own discourse in world affairs' (2012: 
84). 
How does this compare to Japan? At the moment the Japanese government too is 
focussing on the Japanese culture and Japanese cultural products as a source of soft power. 
A big part of that focus lies on anime (and manga), which is the main topic of this thesis. 
The government is even investing in this specific export market as they believe it is a source 
of soft power and therefore beneficial to the Japanese economy and for political 
relationships. The scheme set up by the Japanese government is also a plan to construct 
Japan's national identity in a beneficial way. Earlier in this literature review, I explained the 
meaning of Nihonjinron, nationalistic literature and texts  that focuses on Japan’s 
uniqueness and 'Japaneseness'. Even though Nihonjinron has been viewed at from a 
negative, nationalistic and even right wing perspective by academics, it is still a central and 
popular genre of writing on national identity in Japan and is deeply rooted in popular 
discourse (Burgess 2014). However, after Japan's defeat in World War II, nationalism was 
turned to a sideline and instead, Japan's new pacifist constitution flourished (Shad 2014). 
The concept of Nihonjinron never faded, but was far less popular then it was post World 
War II (2014). Since Abenomics, critics have pointed out that nationalism is making a return 
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to Japanese politics (ibid). And with that the Nihonjinron way of thinking is made its return 
in current politics as well; by promoting everything that 'makes Japan great and unique'. 
The difference is that this time instead of Japan being presented as a unique, but closed 
culture, politicians now choose to present Japan to outsiders as an open and welcoming, but 
still highly unique culture. Self-proclaimed to 'exceed' other countries on various levels (such 
as art, culture and therein, anime). Hence, the political slogan of Shinzo Abe is rei-wa, which 
reads in Japanese as 'beautiful Japan'. A slogan Abe also uses to promote his ideas or a 
constitutional revision (to restore a pre-war Japanese polity based on Emperor-worship) 
(anon. 2019b). It is also the vision Abe used for his book Towards a Beautiful Country: My 
Vision For Japan (Abe 2007), where he describes his pride for Japan, Japan's history and 
unique culture (ibid).  
On another note, the way that Japan is trying to use soft power is similar to how 
China has been using soft power for years. Japan too has realised that they need to portray 
an attractive image of Japan as a valuable economic and political partner and as a culturally 
interesting country. A huge difference is that - even with Japan's wartime past - overall 
Japan is seen as more benign than China (by the West, mostly) in the current era, which 
makes the country better able to deploy its soft power than China to repair its international 
image (Chen 2014). China still engages in using hard power, too, which might explain why 
its soft power is viewed with distrust. Furthermore, there is a difference in how culture is 
being used as a soft power. Whilst Japan is using the Cool Japan scheme with a focus on 
popular culture, China has no equivalent and often still relies on Orientalism (Said 1978) 
(being 'the exotic other') and stereotypical Chinese culture such as martial arts or Chinese 
opera.  
Nye argues that popular culture is more likely to attract people and to produce soft 
power in situations where cultures are similar (2004: 5), which also explains why Japanese 
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media exporters still see the Asian market as an economic priority and therefore mostly use 
this soft power to establish good relationships with other Asian countries. Although Japan’s 
soft power involves the rest of the world as well, China and also other Asian countries in 
general are impressive examples of soft power. China’s marketing strategies are successful 
in Africa and the U.S (Moss 2013), and South Korea’s pop-culture is increasingly growing in 
popularity even outside of Asia; in 2013 South Korea raked in 5 billion dollars from pop-
culture export products (Hong 2014). Therefore, it is no surprise that other (smaller) Asian 
countries closely try to economically follow Japan. According to Nye, Japan’s personal 
income increased from 20% of the U.S. level in 1950 to 75% by the end of the century 
(2004: 84). Soft power, however, can eventually be an effective but long path to choose for 
a country whereas hard power offers a more effective and immediate resolution (Vyas 
2011). So why does Japan choose the path of soft power? It is difficult to control the 
outcomes, but if there are any outcomes it is a relatively cheap way of establishing 
relationships on a friendly basis. A culturally attractive country, as Nye debates, is an 
important source of soft power (2004: 11). But the courses taken by the Japanese 
government in the past years do not come without the risk of failing. Taking this into 
consideration, current strategies might even arise out of desperation. It is important for the 
Japanese government to strengthen current relationships with other countries. According to 
Uptal Vyas (2011: 44), in China in 2003 41% of respondents to an internet poll felt few or 
no feelings of friendship at all towards Japan. The few (20%) that did feel close to Japan 
said it was because of Japan’s fashion, manga and games. So, it seems Japan has an image 
to rebuild in relation to other Asian countries and using soft power is more a necessity than 
a commodity as popular culture seems the main thing that makes Japan attractive to other 
(Asian) countries. As Vyas suggests:  
Due to East Asian countries’ suspicion of Japan’s motives since its attempts before 
the Second World War to carve out an empire from its neighbours, Japan has had to 
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be especially sensitive and patient in order to rebuild its image as a trustworthy 
partner in the region (2011: 59). 
It seems that the Japanese government and industries have realised that the long-term 
effects of soft power are more beneficial for Japan’s image and attraction in other countries. 
 Japanese popular culture is gaining more popularity, hence the fact that 20% of the 
earlier mentioned poll respondents that felt close to Japan feel that way because they like 
Japanese popular culture. I would argue that although Japan’s popular culture is successful 
in Asian regions, Japan has also been growing beyond Asian markets. Intentionally or not, 
the use of soft power does not only involve Asia but over the past decades has been 
spreading through Europe and the United States as well, stimulating this spread of soft 
power thus means more economic success. The Japanese government is only now focussing 
on their cultural economic power, but the Japanese media has been a form of soft power for 
decades. It is therefore no surprise (rather, it is surprising is that the government had 
waited for so long) that there is political interest in using cultural popular products as a soft 
power.  
Criticism of the concept of soft power  
Nye’s concept of soft power is a concept that has received criticism from some scholars. 
Paul Cammack, for example, argues that there are weaknesses in Nye’s theory (Cammack 
2008: 4-20). Focusing particularly on Nye’s theory of soft power in regard to the United 
States, Cammack argues that Nye’s research is based on assumptions rather than facts. He 
identifies certain limitations with the concept of soft power and argues that Nye’s 
conclusions do not always apply to leading countries and states. The United States, for 
example, is seen by many other countries (such as Iraq and Palestine) as a source of the 
problems of war and financial crisis. Therefore, inspiring trust and using soft power to 
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rebuild or strengthen relationships with such countries will not work. Furthermore, he argues 
that 'Nye continues to concern himself with the question of how America should lead, taking 
it for granted that it must' and argues that the three resources that Nye describes as soft 
power (culture, political values and foreign policies) are unrealistic perspectives because 
they do not always apply (ibid: 6). 
 Cammack's critique of Nye’s theory is more applicable to the United States than to 
other countries. However, Hongyi Lai and Yiyi Lu, who focus on soft power in China, criticize 
Nye's theory as well, one example being Nye’s belief in the importance of improving 
international bonds and support for a nation's foreign policy, and creating or maintaining a 
positive image of that nation. This can be in culture, values or how 'appealing' a country is, 
too. Lai and Lu are of the opinion that Nye's listed 'sources' of attraction are too limited and 
miss the most important ones when speaking about the United States, but even more so 
when speaking about China. Arguably, it is likely that China and the USA exert influence not 
just because of their soft power, but because of their hard power, too. As Lai and Lu point 
out, 'hard' power is particularly pertinent in East Asia and, though being in lesser form, in 
South- East Asia (Lai and Lu, 2012: 5). From an economic perspective, American culture is 
still one of the most influential cultures around the world (considering that it is a culture). 
Food, media, and music are all successful internationally and are the sources of soft power 
for the Unites States.  
Cammack's views of course do oversee a broader perspective as he continues to 
argue that America’s demand to lead becomes the central problem, and an obstacle to the 
development of a constructive international agenda (2008: 15). Therefore, the use of soft 
power in international relations is something that is not always possible or applicable and 
the theory that divides soft power and hard power according to Cammack is one that has 
many flaws. Cammack's critique applies mostly to the 'soft power theory' in regards to the 
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US, and Lu and Lai's critique of China's soft power, but when looking at the concept of soft 
power in relation to the ‘Cool Japan Fund’ set up by the Japanese government to use 
Japan’s soft power as an economic weapon, it is a scheme that is receiving criticism as well. 
Critics question whether it is really necessary to use tax money and invest in private 
companies and if eventually these companies will really help Japan to expand their economic 
power and growth (Rochan 2013). Some artists are criticising the concept, too. For example, 
artist Takashi Murakami, who is an internationally well-known Japanese painter, designer 
and director, was already criticising the concept in 2012 and states that he and many other 
artists have no connection to the Cool Japan Fund whatsoever. Murakami believes that the 
scheme was only set up to gain profit and that it exploits the work of Japanese artists 
(Sherman 2012).  
Looking at Nye’s concept of soft power in relation to Japan, scholars such as Yoshiko 
Nakano and Anne Allison provide an example of academic critics of the concept. In Soft 
Power Superpowers: Cultural and National Assets of Japan and the U.S., they debate Nye’s 
concept of soft power in relation to Japan and question whether Japanese cultural products 
such as anime are indeed representatives of Japan’s national identity. They both argue that 
these cultural products do not map as closely with the government in Japan as soft power 
does in America and, therefore, Japan’s soft power is limited (Allison 2008: 99-110), 
(Nakano 2008: 111-127) 
The representation and international trademark of 'Japaneseness' in popular 
culture 
In world cinema, not only anime but also Japanese live action film has made its mark on an 
international level and has engaged foreigners with Japan’s cultural identity. To make a 
comparison with the influence of anime in modern times, and its use as a 'soft power', being 
branded part of Japan's culture, it is worth to first look at the role of Japanese live-action 
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film and its international influence. Films in the 50s and 60s such as Seven Samurai 
(Shichinin no samurai, dir: Akira Kurosawa, Japan, 1954) Godzilla (Gojira, dir: Ishirō Honda, 
Japan, 1954) and Tokyo Story (Tōkyō monogatari, dir: Yasujirō Ozu, 1953) until this day still 
influence contemporary filmmakers both in Japan and abroad. In his essay ‘Consuming Asia: 
Chinese and Japanese Popular Culture and the American Imaginary’ (2003), David Desser 
also describes how anime and Japanese live action films are not only increasingly widely 
available in the United States, but are also a source of influence for Hollywood filmmakers. 
For example, Gojira has been tremendously popular since its original release in 1954. It was 
re-fashioned and Americanized to the film Godzilla: King of the Monsters! (dir: Terry Morse, 
Ishirō Honda, USA/Japan) in 1956, which is when Gojira first became Godzilla. It has been 
released to a new Hollywood version in 1998 and in 2014 a new Hollywood remake was 
released. A new Hollywood Godzilla film, a sequel to the 2014 film, has recently been 
produced and a further follow-up featuring Godzilla alongside King Kong for 2020 release is 
currently in the making. The Godzilla movies are in fact the oldest and longest running 
Japanese film series in film cinema today (Tsutsui 2006: 2). Godzilla is a widely known 
example of a famous movie (character) that is known as being 'typically Japanese'. The first 
Godzilla films was directed by one of Kurosawa's protégés Ishirō Honda. It was the first 
Japanese film that was dubbed into English (Desser 2003: 182)  for U.S. distribution. 
Godzilla  The Godzilla movies are a precursor to contemporary soft power and have invaded 
Western culture, nowadays being a commonly known character and even adopted as a 
reference in the American (but internationally used) word 'bridezilla'.8 Godzilla as a character 
has been the star of many Japanese film versions as well as American adaptations and 
remakes of the films. Every couple of years, Godzilla re-occurs again in a new movie, which 
                                                             
8 In fact, it has become an accepted English slang used in many situations and most commonly referring to a 
monstrous, aggressive and overly eager 'something' such as shopzilla, momzilla or promzilla. It can be a suffix to 
a brand name as well, in which case it is referring to something big, powerful and great (Tsutsui, 2005). 
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makes Godzilla the most accepted and famous (non- traditional) yokai monster (a collective 
name for monsters and supernatural beings that are known in Japan) of Japan in the world.  
 According to Yuki Miyamoto, Godzilla's popularity in Japan was exceptional to begin 
with (Miyamoto 2016: 1086). Miyamoto states that the original movie Gojira attracted 
9,610000 viewers to the movie theatre whilst the total population of Japan the time was 
88,240000, meaning that over ten percent of the entire population saw the film at the 
theatre. In 2004,  28 Godzilla movies had already been produced by Japanese production 
company Tōhō, attracting 99,200000 viewers in fifty years time (whilst the population of 
Japan was approximately 105,000000) making Godzilla, as Miyamoto describes, an 
international icon (2016: 1986). When placing Godzilla alongside  the ways that anime has 
been portrayed and understood in the West, what they have in common is that, just like 
'zilla', the word anime as an abbreviation for Japanese animation has made its mark as a 
noun for the style of Japanese cartoons. In a wider sense, even though (like Godzilla) being 
of Japanese origin, anime has become a commonly known and accepted 'product' of Japan 
stimulating common cross-cultural interests of and co operations of both fans and 
companies.  
 Desser points out that in recent years other popular cultures are also growing 
as a form of soft power (2003: 179-180). Even though other markets are not really rivals of 
the United States, it is no longer merely the United States that is dominating international 
export markets with popular cultural products. Within this context Desser describes the 
influential power of anime, manga and the expanding spread of Japanese media and 
Japanese cultural products (ibid). Japan's soft power thus is not something new, and is not 
only to be found within the cultural products that we can identify as being exclusively 
Japanese. Of particular significance to this debate is the question of 'Japaneseness'. When 
considering anime (where race and background are not necessarily recognisable but 
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regardless, anime is being seen as Japanese by worldwide audiences), anime has a separate 
'identity' and 'look' from all other forms of media: so, what is 'Japaneseness'? And when 
does something become or stay 'Japanese'? To explore the topic of 'Japaneseness' in the 
context of Japanese anime, media and film, one can look at different views and texts on 
Japanese live action film to begin with. For example, the live action films from the Japanese 
film director and screenwriter Akira Kurosawa are often a point of discussion when speaking 
about the topic of 'Japaneseness'. Film scholar Mitsuhiro Yoshimoto explains that one of the 
'legacies' of criticism on 1950s and 1960s Japanese cinema is the use of the 'national 
character' (2000: 10), which has become a 'determinate factor' in analysis and 
interpretations of Japanese cinema. Yoshimoto explains that it has led to stereotypes of the 
Japanese national character and culture. Moreover, this view has been used by many 
journalists and scholars to 'explain' Japanese films in culture, context and backgrounds, or 
as Yoshimoto puts it; 'Many sweeping statements on Japanese culture are made without any 
consideration for its relationship to social practices and history' (2000: 11). As with the 
works of Akira Kurosawa, in many other Japanese live action films as well as (modern) 
anime, 'Japaneseness' - in this context being a reference to the presence of Japanese 
tradition, culture and aesthetic - is often simply assumed without, according to Yoshimoto, 
any critical analysis of that aesthetic (2000: 11).  
As Yoshimoto argues, too, it is difficult to determine where exactly the 'image' of the 
Japanese national character came from. In his chapter ‘Japanese Cinema in Search of a 
Discipline’, Yoshimoto explores various scholars (such as Scott Nygren) and points out that 
the danger of using the term ‘Japaneseness' is that it can be full of stereotypes and clichés 
about Japan. He states:  
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[...]When what is articulated as Japanese "reality" is only a stereotype or cliché 
 constructed by the "Western" reader from the very beginning, how can cross-cultural 
 analysis take place as an event? (Yoshimoto 2000: 11). 
One can say that Japaneseness is, on the one hand, the constructed view of what a non- 
Japanese audience 'think' is typically Japanese, influenced by stereotypes, (popular) culture, 
hypes, media, history and currently, the Japanese government with 'Cool Japan'. 
Conclusion of literature review 
As a conclusion to this literature review, I argue that with the rise of anime and the 'use' of 
anime and anime markets as an economic tool,  the Japanization of Asia and the rest of the 
world have become a political and economic focus point. The course of these recent 
developments along with the transnational aspects of anime are interesting subjects to 
research. Japan’s way of using soft power is bold (and might be compared to America’s soft 
power but is in many ways significantly different, as I will explain later on in this thesis). 
Japan’s cultural economy is highly dependent on gaining interest from foreigners who are 
willing to investigate another culture. On top of that, Japan  needs to reshape and explore 
interest from neighbours within Asia too. Neighbours who have more in common, but as 
economists say, have much more potential as a cultural export market than they have been 
until now. The government is meddling in what once was seen as an independent market 
which is also partially what made Japanese cultural content so attractive to foreigners. On 
that note, scholars such as Amy Shirong Lu still question whether anime indeed (still) is an 
example of the Japanese cultural and national Identity (Lu 2008: 169-187). Taking these 
findings into consideration, the following chapters proceed as follows. In chapter 2, ‘Anime 
as a Japanese cultural product and a (trans)national medium’, I explore if and why anime 
can be seen as a Japanese cultural product and a (trans)national medium. The chapter 
explores whether and how anime (as a part of Japanese popular culture) is of influence on 
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economic, political and sociological levels and how the government has been trying to 
economically stimulate anime and improve international relationships. Chapter 3, ‘The 
cultural and economic influence of Studio Ghibli’, explores whether films that are distinctly 
national can cause a difference in the perception of the films. In this chapter, I explore the 
meaning behind the Studio Ghibli films of, foremost, director Hayao Miyazaki, and discuss in 
what way tradition, religion and culture make these transnational films national in their 
context. This chapter incorporates the theoretical framework of Mjette Hjort, Stephen Crofts 
and Andrew Higson. As part of this national identity, I have researched the use and 
influence of Shinto religion and ideology, which includes references to nature and 
environmentalism. Chapter 4, ‘Neo-nationalism and Pacifism in anime’, explores how neo-
nationalism and pacifism play a role in anime and interrogates the role of anime in 
contemporary Japan, placing anime in the context of national memories, traumas and 
ideologies: investigating debates surrounding anime as a subject of public and political 
debate. Chapter 5, ‘Anime fandom and subculture in the West’, focuses on the 
commercialisation of anime by looking at the subcultures that have derived from anime from 
a Dutch perspective. This chapter explores anime further as a (sub)cultural phenomenon 
and explains the attractiveness of anime subculture and conventions, and explores until 
what extent this is a form of soft power. Furthermore, it explores the globalisation of anime 




Chapter 2. Anime as a Japanese cultural product and a (trans)national medium 
Andrew Higson argues that national identity is about the experience of belonging to a 
community; being raised or immersed in the traditions, rituals and the characteristic cultural 
values of the community (2006: 15-25). I argue that perceived identities (the identity as 
interpreted and regarded through the eyes of foreigners)9 can also become an accepted part 
of the national (and thus cultural) identity over time.10 Furthermore, modern culture has 
become intertwined with Japan’s ancient culture and has therefore also become part of 
Japan's cultural and national identity. This means that both cultural and national identity can 
be subject to change. The national and cultural symbols in many anime productions make 
the films national rather than transnational. Anime can be an example of national cinema. 
Anime often operates on a transnational basis in terms of its distribution and reception. 
When films travel, there is a likelihood that audiences will receive them in a different cultural 
context. The meanings that the things that audiences read into a film, according to  Higson, 
are heavily dependent on the cultural context in which they are being viewed (ibid: 19). 
Distributing anime as 'Japanese cultural product' might, therefore, not necessarily be an 
accurate introduction or familiarisation with the Japanese culture for a foreign audience. On 
that note, I argue that not only the national and cultural identity but also the perceived 
identity is constantly subject to change.  
 As also pointed out by scholar Benedict Anderson, nation, nationality and nationalism 
are all terms that are difficult to define or analyze (2016: 3). Anderson suggests that 
                                                             
9 'Perceived' identity is the identity as interpreted and regarded through the eyes of foreigners, and can over 
time have been assigned to a community regardless if this is in line with reality. 
10 I refer to the term 'cultural identity' meaning Japan's culture as a whole, describing Japan's collective culture 
and how foreigners perceive this culture. However, scholarly, economically or politically, there is no definitive 
meaning attached to the concept of culture and cultural identity. 
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'nationality' or 'nation-ness', as well as nationalism are cultural artefacts of a particular kind 
(ibid: 4). In order to understand them, it is important to look at how they have come into 
historical being and how history has changed these terms over time (ibid: 4). I would also 
like to add to Anderson’s point of view that these terms are also subject to change 
depending on which nation, culture, region or country they are applied to and how 
foreigners as well as domestic citizens perceive an identity or culture. Anderson also 
proposes the term 'imagined' (political) community, meaning that the members of certain 
nations in most cases will never know or meet each other: yet in their mind, they are alike, 
share the same image of their community and perceive themselves and their fellow 
members as one shared community (ibid: 6). There is a deep, horizontal comradeship 
between its members, these communities are 'imagined' as sovereign, and are distinguished 
by the style in which they are imagined (ibid: 6-7). Thus, the term imagined community, 
when looking at modern Japan specifically, is the more appropriate meaning of national 
identity, as Japan’s notion of nationhood is highly depended on political, economic and 
historical references (regardless of whether this history is correct).  
 A nation is thus something that has been invented by individuals and can arise in all 
forms and sizes, having in common that they involve or refer to communities sharing the 
same cultural and/or historical background. When looking at earlier historical periods, Japan 
was perceived as 'the exotic other' in the West. Oriental artwork of (East) Asia, Asian food 
and fashion were a part of the global image of Asia as a whole. In more modern times 
Japan has become famous for its technological and automotive industry: Orientalism still 
plays a huge role in the perception of Japan and no longer necessarily refers to Japanese 
artefacts, cuisine and traditional music or theatre. 11  
                                                             
11 Orientalism is a term  that scholar Edward Said used as reference when discussing the culture of East Asia 
(China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Mongolia and Taiwan) (Said, Edward, 1978).  
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 Nowadays it is also Japan’s popular culture that comes to mind when thinking about 
Japan. Anime in particular has become an important part and a vessel to portray the 
national identity of Japan on a global scale.12 With the international distribution of Osamu 
Tezuka's Astro Boy (Tetsuwan Atomu, Japan, 1963) many international audiences were 
introduced to anime, which became a popular type of entertainment and for many, even the 
first contact with Japanese culture (Daliot-Bul and Otmazgin 2017: 9). The Japanese 
government seems to have embraced indigenous popular culture as a part of Japan’s 
cultural and national identity. We perceive products of popular Japanese culture, such as 
anime, as being directly related to Japan's identity and culture. However, the question is 
whether these products can indeed be labelled as being 'truly Japanese', or whether they 
are just representations of how (political) Japan wishes to represent itself internationally, as 
popular culture has  become the most significant part of Japan’s major growth strategy. In 
the process of boosting Japan's image through 'Cool Japan', Japan's Ministry of Education, 
Culture, Sports, Science and technology embraced popular culture and officially recognised 
anime and manga as a part of their high arts culture, which includes traditional tea 
ceremonies, sumo wrestling, and Kabuki theatre (Choo 2013: 218). The Japanese 
government recognises that these products are not only important for their economy but 
also can improve the international image of Japan (ibid: 219). 
What happens when anime travels as a product? Abenomics and Cool Japan 
Media such as anime, manga and games are gaining economic profit and are growing in 
popularity. For many years the Japanese government did not focus on these new 
developments in popular culture and did not acknowledge or focus on these products as a 
form of soft power. From the 1990s, anime broadcasting rights were sold around the globe 
on a large scale, with the United States being one of the largest buyers (Daliot-Bul and 
                                                             
12 According to scholars, for example Kumiko Saito in the essay ‘Regionalism in the Era of Neo-Nationals’ (2013). 
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Otmazgin 2017: xii). Not only does anime travel in the sense of distribution and worldwide 
markets, but the role of fans and the internet play a huge role as well: the internet has 
become one of the most important platforms for anime fans around the globe to interact 
and collaborate with each other. What is also noticeable is that cartoons and animated films 
nowadays are often influenced by (the Japanese way of drawing) anime characters. Fan 
gatherings such as anime-cons and comic-cons and sales of merchandise play a huge role in 
terms of anime as an economic product, and being 'adopted' as a subculture by other 
countries.  
 The Japanese economy has faced major challenges and ups and downs in the past 
decades. The 90s and early 2000s in particular saw an economic downturn and Japan has 
been facing major economic difficulties. Since the 50s Japan’s economy had been rapidly 
growing. Japan was a massive exporter of products such as consumer electronics which 
contributed to the economy. From the 70s until the late 80s Japan was economically stable, 
and its economy was growing (albeit less rapidly than in earlier years) an average 3.9 
percent in Gross Domestic Product13 (Saxonhouse and Stern 2004: 1-2). In the late 80s 
Japan was involved in an economic boom referred to as the ‘Bubble economy’, amongst 
which cheap capital and financial deregulation contributed to inflation of land and stock 
prices (Bell and McNeill 1999: 763). This economic bubble lasted from 1986 to 1991. From 
1989 onwards, Japan’s GDP started to decline dramatically, and Japan’s bubble finally came 
to burst in 1991, leading to recession and slow or even no economic growth (Wood 2006: 
5). The Japanese stock market collapsed, and share prices dropped to less than half their 
value, leading banks, credit unions and estate companies into debt (Bell and McNeill 1999: 
763).14 The economy went into recession from which it is still trying to recover to this day. 
                                                             
13 GDP: The market value of goods and services within a country. A rising GDP indicates a higher standard of 
living, the lower the GDP is, the lower the standard of living is in a country.  
14 The two decades following after that are referred to as the 'lost decades' of Japan. 
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Arguments about what might have caused the recession involve structural problems: 
banking sector issues, improper monetary policies, high interest rates and cultural factors 
(Callen and Ostry 2003). One of the important factors within Japan’s economic problems are 
that its economy was characterized by a broad supply of products but a lack of domestic 
demand (Koo 2009: 3). Profits had to derive mostly from Japan’s foreign export markets and 
needed to be expanded and successful in order for Japan to be economically stable (2009: 
5).  
 This is exactly where the relation of anime to Japan's current economic status comes 
in. Anime is no longer just 'animation', it is no longer just a form of media created for the 
enjoyment of its spectators. Anime has become an economic force, a cultural product and 
an economic necessity chosen as one of the cultural products to improve Japan's economic 
status. Now that the Japanese government is aiming to boost the economy in a more 
unconventional way, the manner in which the economic export markets were once shaped 
has changed. Auto and electronics industries used to be the main source of economic power 
for Japan but have become victims of competition and rivalry from industries in other 
countries (Nagata 2012). Where once the emphasis was on technological industries and 
investing in the USA as an export market, it now relies more on culture and investing in 
foreign export markets, which makes the future of the Japanese economy very uncertain. 
Anime is a major source of income, one of the many reasons for its cultural interest. 
However, the sales of anime are no longer rapidly growing either. Therefore, the Japanese 
government attempted to boost the acceptance of, and the familiarity with the Japanese 
cultural content in other countries. Not only are these attempts focussed on a cultural level 
where individuals develop an interest in Japan, but they are also focussed on increasing the 
economic status of Japan. Interest in Japan by individual people means more tourism and 
more sales of Japanese export products. Furthermore, cultural attractiveness helps in 
establishing both economic and cultural relationships with Western countries and 
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corporations (for example, media-corporations that work together to gain profit such as 
Studio Ghibli and Disney).  
 Paul du Gay and Michael Pryke discuss the context and meaning of a cultural 
economy; the relation between cultural and economic outcomes. According to them,  an 
organisation which pays attention to its culture will have employees who will be keener to 
contribute to the success of the organisation they work for (Du Gay and Pryke 2002: 97-98). 
On a bigger scale, this is exactly what the Japanese government has been doing: focussing 
on the Japanese culture as an economic power mobilised by Japanese investors, expecting 
to have foreign countries be willing to contribute on an economic level too. Koichi Iwabuchi 
discusses this scenario as well and points out that the spread of Japanese cultural products 
in the world is reflecting the fact that Japanese media industries and cultural forms are 
playing a substantial role in global cultural flows (2002: 24). According to an article in The 
Japan Times (Nagata 2012), the main reason for specifically promoting anime as a cultural 
product is because the global expansion of anime has been scattershot and disorganised, 
which means that Japan had missed out on merchandising opportunities abroad. It argues:  
Even if foreigners find Japan’s cultural goods attractive, if they aren’t supported by a 
platform in the target market the business opportunity will go down the drain, just 
like fashion did in China (Nagata 2012) 
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe’s strategy and its third arrow15 (which involves using 
popular culture as a soft power), in particular, have been facing a lot of criticism since they 
have been implemented. The Japanese government is trying to encourage larger companies 
to invest more in the Japanese economy and the anime industry. But economists argue that 
                                                             
15
 The three arrows are 1) aggressive monetary policy, 2) flexible fiscal policy and 3) growth strategy (According 
to the report 'Abenomics', published by the Government of Japan in May 2017). 
39 
 
Japan is already investing too much as it is.16 In the past 20 years Japan has been investing 
more than any other G5 country,17 which has led to a slow growth of their Gross Domestic 
Product and a poor return on capital.18 Investing even more, economists say, is a plan set 
out to fail (Smithers 2014). When the economy began to deteriorate in the early '90s, the 
Japanese government also tried fiscal stimulus in order to boost the economy. The effects of 
it had been successful at first, but were only temporary and resulted in a large national debt 
(Koo 2009: 25). Even though fiscal stimulus did prevent Japan’s GDP from decreasing even 
more (which therefore protected the nation’s standard of living at the time) (ibid: 26), it is 
not an ideal solution to truly improve an economy and its industries, on which the economy 
is dependent. Another point of critique is that 'Abenomics' tackles the symptoms but not the 
causes of the problems with Japan's economy.19 For example, and as pointed out by William 
Pesek (2014: 172-173), if the Japanese government wants to enhance Japan’s soft power 
and improve foreign export markets, they should firstly improve relations with their direct 
neighbours. Japanese politicians still avoid public acknowledgement of the country’s wartime 
past, partly to remain in good relationships with the United States. Japan’s true imperial 
aggression of the past within Asia is still being ignored and undermined, and has therefore 
offended neighbouring countries. Japan wishes to form deals to establish more market 
access for Japan, and therefore seeks free trade accords with major economies as part of 
their strategy to gain economic growth.20 Trying to stimulate Japan’s economy and soft 
                                                             
16 Such as; Andrew Smithers in his report for the Financial Times. ‘Why Japan Invests too much’, March 20th, 
2014.  
17 United States, United Kingdom, Japan, Germany and France. 
18 Return on capital: a return from investments that are not considered income, so when the investment is paid 
back, it decreases the value of the investment. 
19 Abenomics is the term commonly used by journalists to refer to the economic policies of Japan's prime 
minister Shinzō Abe. 
20 ‘Japan, EU to seek early trade deal, cybersecurity corporation’, The Japan Times, May 8th, 2014. 
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power to boost foreign export markets is not a solution if relationships with the countries 
subjective to the economic growth plan are not improved firstly.   
The current status of popular Japanese cultural products  
Part of Japan’s strategy is to stimulate Japan’s soft power in order to grow economically, 
and therefore the government has formed the ‘Cool Japan Fund’ and has been trying to 
financially stimulate Japanese cultural goods as a soft economic power as the anime 
industry plays a significant role in this scheme. This is a bold choice, because the anime 
industry has not exactly escaped recession either. Current debates by both economists and 
anime creators demonstrate the fears and worries one might have about the future 
perspectives and consequences of the Cool Japan Fund. My question is: why did the 
Japanese government choose to invest so much in anime when the anime market has 
seemingly already peaked? The Cool Japan Fund is a huge part of Abe’s new growth 
strategy, aimed to use Japan’s popular cultural products as a soft power, entrusting the 
economy to thrive and rely on international export markets and the growing popularity of 
Japanese products. 
 Japanese anime, videogames, music, food and fashion have all been popular 
Japanese cultural products in the past decades. Not only are these products well received in 
Asia, but also in Europe and the United States (Iwabuchi 2002: 1). Since the late 1980s 
Japan’s global cultural market started to attract more international academic and media 
attention (ibid: 23). Japanese media such as anime and computer games rapidly started to 
grow in popularity and anime became one of the symbols of Japanese culture (Nagata 
2013). In 1988 about 80 percent of Japanese studio releases were animated, in 1999 
approximately half of all releases from Japanese studio releases were animated (Corliss, 
1999: 49). Japan has been known for its cultural products, but due to the growing 
popularity of anime and video games in the 90s these products especially became part of 
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international export markets and thus became a significant part of global cultural economy. 
Anime and video games are examples of how mass-distributed pop culture can become 
effective tools for the economy (Choo 2013: 213). Even though the economic position of 
popular Japanese content is big, anime creators in Japan have been struggling. The Japan 
Times reported in May 2012 that the anime industry was at a peak in overseas sales in 2006 
with approximately 161 million dollars, going down to approximately 90 million dollars in 
2010 (Nagata 2012). Anime at that time was turning into a less profitable export product, 
and the future economic status of anime and anime-related products did not look promising 
(Martin 2009). Even though the anime fan base was increasing, the industry was no longer 
translating into profits. The anime market was stuck in a so-called ‘animation bubble’. 
Looking at overseas DVD sales in isolation, the anime market merely raised 8.55 billion Yen 
in 2011, almost half of overseas sales in 2006 (Nagata 2013). Reasons for the decreasing 
sales in the West include the growing popularity of illegally downloading content online via 
video sharing sites and growing on-demand services, but are also to be found in a changing 
audience and a lack of mainstream acceptability combined with expensive title licenses 
(Martin 2009). Anime creators in recent years have expressed their concerns, with the 
recession having a negative effect on their industry, resulting in agencies downsizing or 
even going bankrupt. The quality of anime has been decreasing too with the recession 
eating away at production fees and new productions in return being focussed on profits and 
mass production rather than quality (ibid.). When Shinzō Abe announced the Cool Japan 
Fund, it seemed good news for the anime-industry along with other popular cultural 
industries such as music, video games and fashion. The government would now be officially 
investing in the industry to thrive again and to function as one of the economic ambassadors 
of Japanese culture, boosting Japan's image and to opening up foreign export markets. 
Fiscally stimulating anime as a part of Japan’s cultural export market would, according to 
Prime Minister Abe, help to increase productions, create jobs and be financially beneficial for 
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the industry, the people involved and Japan’s economy. But will there be any effects of 
bureaucracy on anime? Now that the government is involved and sees anime a serious 
economic vessel to enhance international strategies, strengthen bonds and boost the 
economy, both economists and scholars argue whether or not the government's influence 
will have an effect on future anime productions and anime related products.21 Many 
initiatives have been conducted by the state and the prime minister's cabinet to boost the 
sector from organizations such as MOFA, METI, The Japan Foundation and the Agency of 
Cultural Affairs (Daliot-Bul and Otmazgin 2017: 147). The government supports cultural and 
media industries on a broad variety of levels such as education, technology, employability 
and also on sharpening distribution and copy write laws to protect the industry: when 
Japan’s content industries became part of a national economic strategy, the Japanese 
government also decided to tackle copyright violation. The problem here is that instead of 
being a helpful solution, this became in fact a discouragement for Japanese anime studios to 
expand internationally (ibid: 147). 
Asian export markets: History related challenges in the distribution of anime  
Since the Second World War, Japan's relationship with other Asian countries has been 
sensitive. Japan was defeated and occupied by Western forces in 1945, and was forced to 
withdraw from China, Taiwan and Korea. During the cold war, Japan established political 
and economic relationships with the United States and was discouraged from establishing 
relationships with communist countries (China and the USSR). As a result of the post-war 
occupation of Japan by the USA, the USA became their most important trading partner, and 
Japan did not have diplomatic relationships with China until 1972 (Vyas 2011: 66). History-
related issues and Japan's brutal actions towards other Asian countries during the war still 
play a significant role in Japan's relationship with other Asian countries. In the 1990s 
                                                             
21 See, for example Michal Daliot-Bul and Nissum Otmazgin (2017). 
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Japanese media industries already realised the Asian market was significant and marketing 
strategies were in order (Iwabuchi 2002: 89). The Asian audiovisual market was booming at 
the time and created a good platform for Japanese export of music and television 
programmes. 
 The influence of Japanese popular culture in East and Southeast Asia in particular 
cannot be denied. However, when leaders of economically significant countries are not able 
to discuss past issues that stand in their way, or to come to political and economic 
agreements, setting up a trade agreement and realising a plan to utilise soft power will be 
difficult. Even if governments are on good terms, individuals still might be reluctant to buy 
Japanese products. The younger generation in Asia seems less resistant to Japanese 
products as the export of Japanese Media products had drastically increased in the 1990s 
(Japanese media was banned in Taiwan and Korea shortly before that). But the Japanese 
media industries were discouraged from exporting products to Asian countries due their past 
legacy of Japanese Imperialism (Iwabuchi 2002: 86). Abe's plans, his so called ' 
Abenonomics' and by extension the Cool Japan Fund, are not only focussed on Western 
countries but also on improving relationships with Asian countries and expanding Asian 
export markets. Abe wishes to remove existing boundaries and open up the both Asian and 
Western export markets. A significant part of that is the Cool Japan fund.  
 In 1978, China and Japan signed 'The Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan 
and the People's Republic of China', in which all political war time issues were waived (Vyas 
2011: 72). But in this ongoing process in which the Japanese government is trying to 
improve political and economic relationships, Asian leaders are still not eager to discuss past 
issues (and how these issues still affect the economy). Not discussing these historical 
events, to other Asian countries, is insulting and similar to Japan not acknowledging what 
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has happened in the past at all. It is doubtful whether, by continuing this way, Japan will be 
able to overcome these past economic and political issues towards the rest of Asia.  
 When one takes China's relative prices of goods and services into account, in 
principle China has a larger economy than Japan. When comparing Japan's economy with 
China’s in terms of dollars, for a long time Japan was the second largest economy in the 
world (Vyas 2013: 64). There is, however, a difference between Japanese export markets in 
Asia and the rest of the world. Firstly, Japanese export markets in other parts of Asia seem 
less restricted in the understanding of and access to Japanese culture because they include 
a broader variety of products such as music, TV dramas and fashion (Iwabuchi 2002: 33). 
Therefore, Japan’s cultural presence is more clearly manifested in Asia itself compared to 
Japanese transnational cultural power in the West. Secondly, when looking at China, for 
example, a different approach is required in order to establish economic successes in Asia. 
Japan's past wartime aggression after the Second World War plays a huge role in Japan’s 
cultural and economic image in the rest of Asia. In recent years, the lack of good relations 
between Japan and China has caused the suspension of official contracts over extended 
periods of time (Vyas 2013: 5). Japan has rebuilt, and still is rebuilding, an image since the 
Second World War and even in this day and age on a political level these countries seem 
suspicious of each other.  
 Many scholars (such as Iwabuchi, Wood, Koo) focus on the economic side effects of 
Japan’s past aggression against other countries. It is more valuable to look at the shifts, 
changes and their effects on Asian export markets in recent years. We have to take into 
consideration that popular culture spreads through East Asian countries (amongst which are 
South Korea and China) regardless of the wartime aggression in the past (Vyas 2013: 61). 
Popular culture was a soft power even before Japan's newly established foreign policies 
(that are focussed on enhancing soft power). An explanation for this might be that the 
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younger generation is letting go of, or even forgetting about, the past, whilst the older 
generation still holds certain reservations about accepting Japanese goods. Since popular 
culture is booming and mainly focussed on the younger generation, a shift in the economy 
on a more sensible level is inevitable. Both the Japanese government and Japanese private 
institutions are focussed on building up a well-respected identity and national brands in 
other parts of Asia, and in recent years has established various organisations to achieve this 
goal. Examples are the Japan Foundation, which started out as a governmental organisation 
established to promote Japanese culture and spread Japanese influence worldwide. It was 
an initiative of, at the time, US President Richard Nixon and the Japanese Prime Minister 
Eisaku Satō in 1972. The original intentions of the Foundation were to improve the 
relationship between the USA and Japan - to avoid communication gaps and cultural 
misunderstandings (2013: 80). Another example is the 'NGO' (a non-governmental 
organisation which too has been established to promote relations between the two 
countries) the Japan China Friendship Association in China, which operates on an 
international level with transnational actors (2013: 130).  
 So, what has the Japanese government already achieved with its new policy? In the 
second quarter of 2014 it was reported by the Japanese Finance Ministry that Japan’s export 
markets rose by 10.8% to approximately 70.8 trillion yen (690.5 million dollars) compared to 
2013 (The Japan Times 2014). The import of products rose by 17.3%, approximately 84.6 
trillion Yen (825 billion dollars). By June 2014, European investors already placed €3.1 billion 
in Japan-focussed funds within the first three months of that year, following a €13.6 billion 
investment in 2013 (Marriage 2014). Since the Cool Japan Fund has been established in 
2013, it has been reported only one year later that business confidence among large 
manufactures rose by March 2014 (Anon 2014b). However, other reports on confidence 
among Japanese citizens and economists in that same 'follow up' year report quite the 
opposite feeling towards Japan’s new growth strategy. How new and promising that strategy 
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really was, was questionable as it is based on policies that have been implemented before, 
as William Pesek has also argued: 
For all the buzz about status-quo-shaking reforms, bold ideas, and a revolution in 
competitiveness, Abenomics sure look a lot like what Japan has been doing for 20 
years now - just on a bigger scale and with a splashier marketing campaign (2014: 
186). 
It seems that the economic policies indeed have a positive effect on exports and thus the 
economy. But in the long term, similar policies in the past did not work as predicted, which 
means that it is difficult to predict a positive or negative outcome of the policies 
implemented since Abe’s second term as a Prime Minister of Japan.  
 The Japanese government has been taking various actions to enhance anime’s 
profile. An important decision that has been made in 2000 is that the Ministry of Education, 
Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT; who administrate the cultural promotion of 
Japanese products) officially recognised anime and manga as part of Japan's high-art culture 
(Choo 2013: 218). It is questionable whether this decision has been made with economic 
profits in mind or if this step has been taken genuinely because the government and MEXT 
feel that anime can no longer be denied as being part of Japan’s national identity and 
cultural heritage. Furthermore, in recent years METI has launched various projects to put 
anime in the limelight. The government has invested directly into the industry and launched 
events and marketing campaigns to boost the popularity of anime overseas. According to 
Kazuaki Nagata in The Japan Times, by 2011 METI in Japan already sponsored 13 Cool 
Japan projects in the United States, France, China, South Korea, Singapore, Brazil, Italy and 
India (Nagata 2012). The overall goal of these projects is to promote Japanese creative 
industries abroad. Although the focus lays on Asia, other countries are surely a huge part of 
this scheme too. In March 2014 according to The Japan Times, a huge B2B event ‘Tokyo 
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Bigsight’ took place to bring together domestic and overseas players in the market. And in 
July 2014 the Japanese government launched a major campaign to prevent illegal 
downloading and illegal online viewings (mainly in China) of copyrighted anime and manga 
(Kelts 2014). These are just a few examples among the many efforts the Japanese 
government is making to make anime an economically attractive product.  
 With the government's involvement, anime creators express their concerns. For 
example, anime creator Hayao Miyazaki has expressed his concerns about the future of 
anime, now that the NHK (Nippon Hoso Kyokai, Japan Broadcasting Corporation) and the 
government interfere with their work.22 An anonymous veteran Japanese movie producer 
who spoke to TIME expresses his cynicism too, stating that the investments will only be 
funnelled away to big advertisement companies but will not reach the actual anime creators 
(Kelts 2014). In 2018, The Japan Times reported that the anime-industry was in the middle 
of a boom, attracting new players such as Netflix, on which platform popular anime is now 
available for streaming (Schley: 2018). Anime production companies are even receiving 
funding from a foundation set up by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (Manga 
Productions). Additionally, many companies (such as Japanese electronic commerce giant 
DMM (DMM Pictures) are investing in anime and popular culture. According to The Japan 
Times, several major sectors of the market (including streaming, international and box 
office) where on their highest peak ever in 2016. 
Conclusion  
In this chapter I have argued that anime can be seen as a Japanese cultural product and a 
(trans)national medium. By looking at ideas from Andrew Higson and Benedict Anderson, I 
have explained that national identity is about the experience of belonging to a community 
and argued that perceived and 'imagined' identities can also become an accepted part of the 
                                                             
22 In the documentary The Kingdom of Dreams and Madness’, Studio Ghibli, 2013.  
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national (and thus cultural) identity over time. Both cultural and national identity can be 
subject to change.  
 I have argued that in anime, national and cultural symbols make the films national 
rather than transnational. Furthermore, the meanings that audiences read into a film are 
dependent on the cultural context in which they are being viewed. The perception we have 
of Japan is of great influence on economic, political and sociological levels. At the same 
time, anime has become a tool for economic profit and over the years has grown in 
popularity.  
 After facing an economic downturn in the 90s and early 2000s, with profits deriving 
mostly from Japan’s foreign exports markets and realizing that cultural attractiveness helps 
in establishing both economic and cultural relationships with Western countries and 
corporations, the Japanese government decided that anime (as a part of popular culture) 
should be used as a 'soft power' to improve Japan's economic status. The government has 
formed the ‘Cool Japan Fund’ and has been trying to financially stimulate Japanese cultural 
goods. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe’s strategy has been facing a lot of criticism 
since, and economists argue that Japan is already investing too much as it is, leading to a 
slow growth of their Gross Domestic Product and a poor return on capital. Furthermore, it 
has been argued that Japan should firstly improve relations with their direct neighbours and 
acknowledge more openly the country’s wartime past to remain in good relationships.  
 I argued that anime has become an example of how mass-distributed pop culture 
can become an effective tool for the economy. The Japanese government now supports 
cultural and media industries even in education, technology, employability and also by 
sharpening distribution and copy write laws, whilst at the same time focussing on the 
younger generation (who are not as influenced or prejudiced anymore in regards to Japan's 
wartime-past, compared to their ancestors). I can conclude that, seemingly, the economic 
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policies have had a positive effect on the Japanese economy, even though they have been 
facing criticism in previous years. It is still questionable whether the government's 
involvement and interference in anime will be beneficial for the artistic freedom of anime, 
and will reach actual anime creators. Even so, the anime industry is currently still attracting 
new players, streaming services, and (foreign) investors and has been at the highest peak in 






Chapter 3. The cultural and economic influence of Studio Ghibli  
Ask a random animation fan the first production company that comes to mind when 
speaking about anime, and they will most likely answer 'Studio Ghibli'. When discussing the 
economies of anime, it is production company Studio Ghibli that stands out and is commonly 
know by a wide range of audiences. The films are popular worldwide (the West, but also 
other countries such as Korea, Brazil and Malaysia). Whilst being known for its productions 
often representing the cultural and national identity of Japan, at the same time Ghibli is the 
most commonly known, and therefore arguably the best example of an international and 
economically successful anime production company. This thesis explores anime as a form of 
soft power for Japan and I argue here that, for a long time before the Japanese government 
started to push the animation industry as a soft power, anime, and within the anime 
industry, Studio Ghibli in particular, has been an individual source of soft power for Japan 
and within the worldwide animation industry. The aesthetics of Ghibli films have been and 
are still extremely influential for the animation industry. But, the films of Studio Ghibli did 
not become popular on their looks and storylines only but are also a perfect example of 
commercialised transnational anime. As scholar Shiro Yoshioka suggests, the films have 
been well-promoted, sponsored, and nowadays have budgets of hundreds of millions of 
yens behind them (Yoshioka 2018: 15).   
 What makes Studio Ghibli stand out is that, as a company, it distances itself from the 
ideologies of the 2019 Japanese government. Co-founder Hayao Miyazaki has repeatedly 
spoken out against the government and, for example, has been denouncing Prime Minister 
Shinzō Abe's plans to remilitarise Japan or to amend Japan's constitution.23 That same 
government is commercialising anime and pushing anime as a soft power. However, even 
                                                             
23 For example, in the article 'Famed director Miyazaki calls Abe's move to revise Constitution 'despicable'' 
(Yoshida, Reiji, The Japan Times, July 13th 2015). 
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without the government’s interference, Studio Ghibli managed to become a soft power 
agent on its own. And that, is, arguably, the best example (for the Japanese government, 
too) of how to turn Japanese popular culture into an internationally profitable and culturally 
influential product. Or, in short: the popularity of Studio Ghibli productions makes one of the 
best examples of anime as a form of soft power - even long before the Japanese 
Government announced their anime industry as such. Furthermore, whilst Ghibli is known 
worldwide, their films are  still 'accented' in the sense that there are culturally specific 
themes. At the same time, the films are dubbed by famous American actors for their 
English-language releases. And this even goes further: Ghibli films that are seen as too 
culturally specific are even dubbed to such an extent that the actual context of the movie 
has been adapted and changed because of it, as is the case with for example Princess 
Mononoke (Mononoke-Hime, dir: Hayao Miyazaki, Japan, 1997) (Pizzuto 2018: 61-62) and 
Spirited Away. I will write about this in more detail in the later discussion of Miyazaki’s use 
of Japanese mythology. 
 The studio is responsible for a major non-Japanese fan base who engage with Ghibli 
films in particular. The purpose of this chapter is thus to explore the success and the themes 
of Studio Ghibli by looking at the works of co-founder and director Hayao Miyazaki. By doing 
so, I explore Miyazaki's films as examples of a soft power: popular- commercialised cultural 
products on the one hand, and products that are deeply national in their context (referring 
to Japanese religion, tradition and as a part of that, environmentalism) on the other. In 
relation to anime as a soft power, I use Studio Ghibli and Miyazaki's work to explore the 
broader themes in this thesis (and, in anime in general) that have played a significant role in 
the worldwide popularization of anime and anime 'branding'. By doing so, I argue that the 
works of Hayao Miyazaki have paved a way for culturally specific themes to be accepted and 
welcomed internationally. Stimulating and inspiring international audiences and international 
production companies to embrace 'exotic' themes. With this reason, I am using a selection 
53 
 
of Miyazaki's films set in Japan, as these films serve as good example of (Japanese) 
culturally specific themes.24 Furthermore, Studio Ghibli surpasses other anime productions 
companies by becoming a major corporation. For example, Ghibli is not only playing a role in 
Japan’s animation industry, but by continuously developing new business opportunities and 
cooperating with international markets, also encourages tourists to visit Japan (and offering 
them merchandise, a Ghibli museum and a Ghibli theme park from 2022). What was once 
only a production company has now become a major cultural industry (Rendell and Denison 
2018: 9). As a company, Studio Ghibli has managed to successfully push Japanese and to a 
global market. This, I would like to emphasise again, not only makes them an example of a 
soft power, but also an, arguably more successful, example of what the Japanese 
government is trying to accomplish with popular culture as a whole.  
 Among the founders of Studio Ghibli, Hayao Miyazaki and Isao Takahata are the two 
best known outside of Japan and are among the most prominent directors within the field of 
Anime. They created Studio Ghibli together with Yasuyoshi Tokuma and Toshio Suzuki to 
make artistic animation without being bound by the rules of others. They created this studio 
out of necessity when other Studios repeatedly refused to produce their films or even look 
at their scripts for feature animation films.25 Today, Studio Ghibli has become one of the 
most recognizable animation brands, of which the most famous director Hayao Miyazaki 
(arguably the biggest director at the moment in worldwide animation industries and the 
internationally most well-known face of Studio Ghibli) managed to break records in box 
offices hits exceeding profits of $100 million (Denison 2015: 117).  
                                                             
24 Also, exploring each Ghibli or Miyazaki film in detail is beyond the scope of this research. 
25 Information taken from The Birth Story of Studio Ghibli, published as an extra feature on Nausicaä of the 
Valley of the Wind (DVD); Japan (Nibraki- GH, 1984, re- distributed by Studio Ghibli in 2005). 
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 Before Studio Ghibli was founded, Hayao Miyazaki and especially Isao Takahata had 
been involved in many projects. Some of their pre-Ghibli work was distributed by Tōei 
Animation studios. They were also involved in short films, contributed to magazines and 
made commercials. Takahata started to work at Tōei Studios (also known as Tōei Dōga: 
Dōga means 'Moving Pictures' or 'animated drawings') in 1961 as an assistant director. 
Hayao Miyazaki started working at Tōei as a temp in 1963. Miyazaki was only 22 at the time 
and started towards becoming one of the most important figures for the development and 
worldwide popularity of Japanese animation. The pair started working together on the Tōei 
Animation series Wolf Boy Ken (Ookami shõnen Ken, dir: Isao Takahata, 1963). With 
Miyazaki still as a temp and in-between animator at the time and Takahata as a director. 
The first feature film Takahata worked on as a director with Tōei Animation was The Little 
Norse Prince (Taiyō no ōji: Horusu no daibōken, dir: Isao Takahata, 1968, Japan). It was a 
film based on Western mythology and literature portrayed through Japanese eyes. Miyazaki 
was contributing to this film as a key animator and scene designer (Lamarre 2009: 15). 
Another early project Takahata and Miyazaki made together was the more famous series of 
Heidi: Girl of the Alps (Arupsu no shõjo Haiije, dir: Isao Takahata, 1974, Japan). This is an 
important piece of work to mention because for me and arguably many other people 
growing up in Europe in the 70s or 80s it was one of the first introductions to anime, 
without us realising it was anime. Takahata was the director and Miyazaki was responsible 
for the scene design and layout.  
 Hayao Miyazaki’s first solo debut as a director was with the series Future Boy Conan 
(Mirai shōnen Konan, dir: Hayao Miyazaki, Japan, 1978). Takahata and Miyazaki developed 
Studio Ghibli in 1985. The first official Studio Ghibli film was Castle in the Sky (Tenkû no 
shiro Rapyuta, dir: Hayao Miyazaki, Japan, 1986). Spirited Away (Sen to Chihiro no 
Kamikakushi, dir: Hayao Miyazaki, Japan, 2002) was the film that cemented the reputation 
of Studio Ghibli in the West. In Japan itself Spirited Away was the biggest box-office hit in a 
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hundred years of Japanese cinema history (McDonald 2006: 177). For a long time, it was 
even the most successful anime of all time, until it was surpassed by Makato Shinkai's Your 
Name (Kimi no na wa, Japan) in 2016. Before Spirited Away was released, Studio Ghibli had 
already made a deal with Walt Disney Studios in 1997, to distribute and translate their films 
in the West. 
Ghibli influences, cooperation and brand expansion.  
A majority of the films of Studio Ghibli are distributed in the West and have become globally 
recognised as Japanese cinema, but still manage to embrace the national. However, some 
movies of Studio Ghibli are crossing Japans cultural borders and have been inspired by other 
animation and by Western tales as well. For example Arietty (Kari-gurashi no Arietti, dir: 
Hiromasa Yonebayashi, Japan, 2010) was based on the English children's book The 
Borrowers  by Mary Norton, Tales from the Earthsea (Gedo Senki, dir: Gorō Miyazaki, Japan, 
2007) was based on the fantasy novels of American author Ursula K. Le Guin) and Ponyo 
(Gake no Ue no Ponyo, dir: Hayao Miyazaki, Japan, 2008) was inspired by the Danish fairy 
tale of Hans Christian Andersen. Even so, with Studio Ghibli films becoming famous 
internationally, it was only a matter of time before Ghibli's work  influenced Western 
filmmakers and animators. For example, Pixar Studio's John Lasseter has been influenced by 
Miyazaki's work on several occasions, as he suggests in the documentary The Kingdom of 
Dreams and Madness (Dir: Mami Sunada, Japan, 2013). Snow White and the Huntsman 
(USA, 2012) from director Evan Daugherty, was also partly inspired by Princess Mononoke.26 
 As a brand, Studio Ghibli has not only been co-operating with other production 
companies in the distribution of their own movies, but is also attempting to build a bigger 
international brand by buying and giving opportunities to non-Japanese animators. As 
Denison suggests, Studio Ghibli's brand is indeed ʺbeginning to echo the practices of USA's 
                                                             
26 As stated on IMBD.  
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biggest animation conglomerates, buying up what is seen as similar texts and incorporating 
them under its umbrella to extend its brand meaningsʺ (Denison 2015: 123). In closer 
connection to my own regions, for example, the film The Red Turtle (Dir: Michael Dudok de 
Wit, Japan/France 2016) was produced by Studio Ghibli in 2016. The film is an example of 
what Hjort refers to as 'auteurist' transnationalism. In which case, the driving force is an 
individual director who embraces co-operation between national borders (Hjort 2019: 23). 
The film was a co-operation between Dutch director, Michael Dudok de Wit, and Studio 
Ghibli, but was produced a Japanese/French co-production.  
 The promotion of Studio Ghibli and Ghibli products is an important part of 
international branding. This includes the production and distribution of Ghibli merchandise, 
but also, for example, the Studio Ghibli Museum and, as earlier mentioned, the soon-to-be 
Ghibli theme park, which, according to BBC news.27 will open sometime around 2022. Studio 
Ghibli fans are eager to collect items and Ghibli experiences (such as visiting the museum) 
and reinforce a strong brand identity (Rendell 2018: 103). Studio Ghibli's producer Toshio 
Suzuki is often described by scholars as the man behind the commercial success of Ghibli.28 
Studio Ghibli in the context of national cinema 
In the discussion of the soft power that Ghibli films hold on a global level, whilst still 
honouring the Japanese national identity in many of their anime productions, it is important 
to explore the national and cultural references and unravel the 'deeper meaning' of Studio 
Ghibli films. It is notable that many of Ghibli's earlier works often represent idealism about 
living in harmony with nature and the self-destructive behaviour of mankind, using 
references to Japanese beliefs, such as Shinto and Buddhism, and incorporating Japanese 
                                                             
27 2 June 2017 'Studio Ghibli to open 'Totoro' theme park in Japan'.  
28 For example, in Shiro Yoshioka's essay Toshio's movie castle: A historical overview of Studio Ghibli's 
collaboration and promotional strategies (2018). 
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culture and mythology. As discussed earlier, anime plays a significant role in the image we 
have of Japan and international audiences have embraced anime as a product of Japanese 
cultural and national Identity. Ghibli films are known by a broad international audience, are 
amongst the highest grossing films in Japan and have been given prestigious awards on 
various occasions.29 Spirited Away (McDonald 2006: 177) is one of the movies that has 
become famous on an international level but did not compromise on its Japanese identity 
(Wright and Clode 2005: 46-51). In an interview in Screen International in 2009 Hayao 
Miyazaki explains: 
 I think it’s important for our films to be shown around the world, but initially we are 
 concerned about how the Japanese audience will receive the films. We don’t make 
 them with an awareness of an international audience[...] (Goodridge 2009: 16) 
As described in the literature review, Stephen Crofts identifies numerous different types of 
national cinema, of which one in particular is relevant to the work of Studio Ghibli: National 
cinemas whose culture and language focus foremost on an domestic audience (Crofts 2006: 
45). In Higson’s essay ‘The Limited Imagination of National Cinema’ (2006: 15-25) he 
explains that ‘national identity’ is about the experience of belonging to a community, being 
raised or immersed in the traditions, rituals and the characteristic cultural values of a 
specific community. The national and cultural symbols in many Studio Ghibli films make the 
films national rather than transnational, too. However, we might also consider Mette Hjort’s 
'marked' and 'unmarked' transnationality in relation to Ghibli (2010: 14). In Studio Ghibli 
films, both can be found: especially earlier films, such as Spirited Away and Princess 
                                                             
29 A full list of awards can be found on www.IMBd.com. Going as far back as the 80s, Awards include various 
awards among which are; best animated film awards, audience awards, best director (Miyazaki/ Takahata), and 
outstanding achievement awards. In 2003, 2006 and 2014 Miyazaki's films won or were nominated for Oscars 
during the USA Academy Awards for best Animated Feature Film. In 2015 Miyazaki won an honorary award 
during the US Academy Awards.  
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Mononoke were made with a domestic audiences in mind, but became transnational in 
terms of distribution. When referring to 'marked' transnational films, the later works of 
Studio Ghibli apply: their directors were aware of their international audience and thus made 
films (that are in some cases still very national in their storyline and reference) whilst 
knowing that the films were to be produced internationally, encouraging spectators to think 
of them in a transnational way. Such is the case with, for example, Arietty.  
 By combining forces with international companies such as Walt Disney Studios, Ghibli 
has paved the way for a broader transnational audience (which Hjort refers to as 
opportunistic transnationalism (2010: 19). But regardless, many people still might have a 
different kind of perception of them to that of the Japanese audience. I do acknowledge the 
fact that there are many viewers who feel the need to explore the meaning of the films 
more thoroughly and that the films in general can be understood by a non-Japanese 
audience in the overall storyline. However, my point is that for an older national Japanese 
audience, in most cases there is simply no need for the spectators to explore the meaning 
behind the films further or accept a general storyline without understanding the depth of the 
film. The meaning is apparent in their national identity and is deeply rooted in their culture, 
but I refer to the 'older' Japanese generation especially because (as is the case with many 
cultures) the younger generations are often perceived  to have lost touch with their 'roots' 
and might be just as mystified as foreigners. For example, Miyazaki pointed out that the 
older Japanese generation perceives the film Spirited Away as nostalgic. Whilst at the same 
time, the 'Japaneseness' of the film might be just as unique and new for Japanese children, 
as it is for foreigners (Osmond 2008: 13).  As a matter of fact, traditions in Japan are 
noticeably fading as the more rural areas are facing de-population, and with that, loosing 
cultural traditions (Fujioka and Cislo 2017). As a result, many cultural events are 
disappearing rapidly, because the newer generations either do not know how to do certain 
ceremonies or have no interest in learning about them at all (ibid). For Miyazaki, this is all 
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the more reason to produce national films, as he explains in his book Starting Point 
(Miyazaki 1996: 355-356). 
Ghibli operates on a transnational basis in terms of the distribution and reception of their 
films. But when films travel, there is a possibility that audiences will receive them in a 
different way or in a different cultural context: the meanings an audience reads into a film 
are heavily dependent on the cultural context in which they are watched. Dubbing or 
subtitling can also make a difference in the perception of a film (Higson 2006: 19). I will 
discuss this phenomenon later on in this chapter by looking at Princess Mononoke and the 
character of Haku in Spirited Away. Films that are globally distributed introduce unfamiliar or 
‘exotic’ elements to other cultures, in this case the Japanese culture to the Western culture 
of the USA and Europe. A possibility is that foreign films with unfamiliar elements are 
interpreted according to what Higson calls an 'indigenous frame of reference' (2006: 19). 
Spectators apply their own frame of reference and/or experiences which often results in 
misinterpretations. So, what does this mean when it comes to Studio Ghibli with so many 
fans and viewers all over the world? Miyazaki’s proclaimed lack of awareness of an 
international audience is what makes the films beautiful; it represents the world from a 
Japanese perspective and has been an introduction to Japan and anime for many 
spectators. Mythology, tradition and religion are all significant parts of Japanese culture. The 
natural world and environment are of great importance within Shintoism, which is one of the 
major religions in Japan. Even if these films have become known internationally, the context 
of the films can be read in different ways depending on the context in which they are being 
watched. For example, the film Princess Mononoke has been compared to the story of Christ 
and the character Ashitaka to Jesus (Hoff Kreamer 2004: 1). However, in Miyazaki's Starting 
Point, a selection of interviews and texts in which Miyazaki describes many of his films in 
detail, when he describes the story of Ashitaka in detail there is no explanation or 
suggestion that this was intentional (Miyazaki 1996: 383-339, 390-407).   
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The representation of Shintoism and environmentalism in Ghibli films   
When discussing the national identity of Japan, religion is a part of the Japanese identity 
that stands out, arguably, in a much deeper sense than we are used to in the Western 
world. Religion can be found throughout the whole country (for example in ceremonies, 
tradition, 
 landscapes and buildings). As this thesis is focussed on the national identity and 
'economies' of anime and thus the national identity of Japan, it is important to also explain 
the portrayal of religion in anime productions to fully understand this topic. Therefore, I also 
choose to explore the works of Studio Ghibli as an example of films where Shintoism, the 
Japanese 'supernatural' world and environmentalism are portrayed as part of the national. 
Secondly, as I argued earlier in this chapter, when films are highly national in their 
representations of tradition and culture, spectators might not always fully understand them. 
In the following paragraphs I therefore explain the context and deeper meaning of a few 
selected Studio Ghibli films as an example of anime where religion - as part of the Japanese 
national identity - is deeply embedded the films.    
 The three major beliefs in Japan are Shinto, Buddhism and Japanese Confucian 
Philosophy. Shinto (‘The way of the gods’ ) is a Japanese religion that is deeply embedded in 
Japanese culture and has existed for at least 2000 years. Buddhism goes back to sometime 
around 600 BCE (Geshe 2011: 3). Over time, Buddhism and Shinto have influenced each 
other and today many Japanese ceremonies are a blend of Shinto and Buddhism. Shinto is 
one of the few animistic faiths: the concept where souls, gods and spirits not only live in 
humans and animals, but are omnipresent in all sorts of living or non-living objects such as 
nature, mountains, landscapes, and even abstract objects such as words. These way of the 
gods  are known as the Kami no Michi. The Shinto beliefs and practices revolve around the 
worship of these supernatural beings (Littleton 2002: 13-19). Ecology is of great importance 
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within Shinto religion as the environment too is part of the spirit world and is equally blessed 
and worshipped.  
 One of many examples of a Ghibli film that contains influences of the Shinto way of 
thinking is Nausicaä of the Valley of the Wind (Kaze no Tani no Naushika, dir: Hayao 
Miyazaki, 1984, Japan). Miyazaki explains that the story was also inspired by his and his 
colleagues’ experiences with pollution, the nearby polluted rivers in particular (Miyazaki 
1996: 167). Miyazaki has said that the one event that gave him inspiration for the film was 
the pollution of the Minamata Bay (Kumamoto Prefecture, Japan) with mercury in the '50s 
and '60s (1996: 169-170). The situation was so severe that there were health concerns and 
the people of the town where no longer allowed to fish in the bay. The odd thing about it 
was that the fish stocks in the area increased rather than decreased, and Miyazaki was 
surprised that the living creatures were able to survive with so much poison and pollution 
around them (Wright 2005: 2).  
 The story of Nausicaä of the valley of the Wind takes place 1000 years after the 
collapse of industrial civilisation. Humans have polluted the earth so much it has caused a 
toxic swamp that covers the earth and is threatening human survival. This toxic swamp is a 
result of 'the sea of decay' and is spreading rapidly. The irony of the story is that the sea of 
decay was originally an artificial eco-system created by humans to cleanse the environment 
but over time transformed into something harmful to nature. The people have damaged the 
Kami, in the shape of nature, and this has resulted in the development of many giant 
insects, including giant centipedes and the 'Ohmu' (which means ‘King Insect’), creatures 
that look like giant woodlice. In Buddhism, centipedes are impure, polluted animals that are 
associated with death (Ashkenazi 2003: 116). In Nausicaä of the Valley of the Wind the 
centipedes among other insects represent the harm humans have done to nature and the 
death they have caused. They are also a sign that mankind is on the brink of extinction. The 
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story involves the heroic girl Nausicaä, the princess of the valley of the wind. She seems to 
be the only one that understands that people are dependent upon the environment, and 
should engage with nature rather than destroy it (Miyazaki 1996: 251). The character of 
Nausicaä was inspired by both Japanese and Greek mythology. In Greek mythology 
Nausicaä is a Phaecian princess who appears in Homer’s Odyssey.30 She was a beautiful 
woman that played the harp and sang. She was also said to be a lover of the hero 
Odysseus. In Japanese mythology, there is a collection of stories from the 11th century 
named Tales from the Tsutsumi Middle Counsellor (Tsutsumi chu-nagon monogatari). It 
involves a princess who lived in Japan’s Heian period (794 – 1185) and loved insects and 
nature. She was found to be odd as she spent so much time playing with insects and was 
known to be a girl that did however she pleased. When Hayao Miyazaki was encouraged to 
draw a manga for Animage (a Japanese magazine about Anime and Manga established in 
1978) he decided to incorporate the stories and to draw his own version of Nausicaä 
(Miyazaki 1996: 283-284), which later on was made into the film Nausicaä of the Valley of 
the Wind. 31  
 The images in Nausicaa also seem to be influenced by Aztec-like styles and early 
European architecture: according to Miyazaki the scenery and setting are partly modelled 
after the 'Bayeux Tapestry' (Looser 2010: 316), a famous nine century-old embroidered 
cloth of almost 70 metres, showing the events leading up to the Norman conquest of 
England. Nausicaä is a film that has set the style and themes for which Studio Ghibli now is 
famous. There is a substantial difference between Miyazaki’s and the film’s producer 
                                                             
30 One of the famous ancient Greek writings, which is believed to have been composed around 800 BCE. The 
poem describes the journey of Odysseus.  
31 The magazine has information about new Manga and Anime releases but also publishes Manga series within 




Takahata’s pre-Nausicaä work and their work after Nausicaä. The film is more serious and 
aimed at an older audience, while earlier work contained less serious topics that were more 
suitable for children. Nausicaä of the Valley of the Wind was the first in a line of films that 
engaged with a Japanese audience and Japanese culture. By creating Studio Ghibli shortly 
after the film Nausicaä, Miyazaki was able to continue making artistically free films that 
consisted of topics and themes to which felt personally connected to.  
 After Nausicaä of the Valley of the Wind and the first Ghibli release Laputa: Castle in 
the Sky (Tenkū no Shiro Rapyuta, dir: Hayao Miyazaki, 1986, Japan), Studio Ghibli produced 
two films that were more appealing for the younger generation. These were My Neighbour 
Totoro (Tonari no Totoro, dir: Hayao Miyazaki, 1988, Japan) and Kiki’s Delivery Service 
(Majo no takkyūbin, dir: Hayao Miyazaki, 1989, Japan). My Neighbour Totoro is about the 
relationship between the kami (gods) and the humans. The original aim of My Neighbour 
Totoro was to be a 'happy and heart-warming film that lets the audience go home with 
pleasant and glad feelings' (Miyazaki 1996: 255). It is also the film that is responsible for the 
current brand-identity of Ghibli: the image of Totoro has become part of the Ghibli logo and 
is the most famous reference to Ghibli; including its own impressive line of widely available 
merchandise. The story of Totoro purposely takes place in an unspecified period in Japan 
(Miyazaki has left this open to the spectator's own interpretations) and focuses on how 
children are losing touch with nature (Miyazaki 1996: 355-377). It is a film that has become 
incredibly popular in Japan and because of its message even contributed to the preservation 
of nature in Japan. There is an area that is now called ‘The Homeland of Totoro’ (Odell and 
Le Blanc 2009: 54) within the Sayama Hills and is preserved by the ‘Totoro no Furaso 
Foundation’,32 a charity that is founded to take care of Japan’s nature. There is also a 
                                                             
32 The Sayama Hills are located 40 km (24 miles) from Tokyo and overlap an area of 3500ha (8650 acres) and 11 




‘Totoro Forest’ that was established by the Furaso Foundation in 1991. This makes Totoro 
direct proof of how influential (and thus a soft power, economically or otherwise) anime and 
the message it is containing can actually be.  
 In an interview with Hiroaki Ikeda in June 1988, republished in Starting Point 1979-
1996, Miyazaki explains more about the settings of My Neighbour Totoro, stating: 
The setting for the story is actually taken from many places. It is a combination of 
the area near Seijō Sakuragaoka where Nippon Animation is located, the area 
surrounding the Kandagawa River where I grew up, and the landscape of 
Tokorozawa where I live now. The art from director Kazuo-san is from Akita in the 
North (Miyazaki 1996: 350). 
Miyazaki used places he is familiar with, his own experiences of Japanese tradition and 
Shintoism, his childhood and the children around him as an inspiration and hoped that this 
film would inspire children to explore the world around them (1996: 355-356). The main 
characters of the film are two young girls who moved to the countryside due their mother’s 
illness (possibly a reference to Miyazaki own childhood, in which his mother suffered from 
tuberculosis for many years). Whilst exploring their new surroundings they discover ‘Totoro’ 
and his friends. Totoro is a woodland kami (a 'forest god').  According to Miyazaki they are 
the ‘Goblins’ of the transitional phase when Japan hadn’t become entirely modernised 
(Miyazaki 1996: 355-361). The reason Totoro’s forest is dark and that he lives inside a tree 
is because, as Miyazaki states, when you enter a Japanese forest, it is dark and exciting, 'It 
feels like an animal might be lurking just out of sight' (Miyazaki 1996: 359). Miyazaki points 
out that Westerners often think that dark is evil, and light is good. But for the Japanese it is 
different. Gods are usually in the forests or in the mountains, so that also explains why 
shrines are often found in those areas. When the youngest girl Mei discovers Totoro, her 
father decides to bring them to one of these forest shrines to pay their respects to the forest 
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gods. It is a shrine in form of huge Camphor tree accessible by passing through a torii, a 
sacred gateway. The torii marks the boundary between the impure, outer and secular world 
and the ‘sacred confines’ of the shrine. The person who passes through it undergoes a 
symbolic ritual purification of the pollution from the outer world (Littleton 2002: 70). The 
Camphor tree itself has ritual cords of rice straw and paper streamers wrapped around it, 
which shows the tree is sacred (McCarthy 2002: 123).  
Throughout the film, symbols like these, spirit statues and shrines, are often 
displayed. These images are very significant as they are familiar for a domestic audience, 
who are able to recognise the deeper meaning of these symbols in order to understand 
what will happen, or what is currently happening in the film. However, for those who are not 
familiar with these references, the film plot is still enjoyable, and the storyline still makes 
sense. The difference is that they don't get 'a heads up' about what can or might happen. In 
a sense, the symbols Miyazaki incorporated already give away the direction in which the 
story is heading before seeing the next scenes. And when one does find out what they 
mean, the films can be watched from a different perspective. For example, when the girls 
walk home from school they stop at one of the statues, a Sae-no-Kami (Kami of the roads), 
referred to in Japanese mythology as a Dosōjin  (Ashkenazi 2003: 241) and ask the god to 
let the rain stop (see Figure 1). It is a roadside Shinto kami that functions as a protector for 
travellers and can be found all over Japan.  
 When the rain doesn’t stop, they decide to go to the bus stop, where one of the girls 
discovers another shrine that’s surrounded with statues of foxes (see Figure 2). This is a 
typical Japanese Inari shrine. In Shinto, Fox spirits are said to have the ability to possess a 
person, and are one of the most feared animal spirits. White foxes, in particular, are said to 
be the most powerful creatures among them. But the fox spirit is also closely associated 
with the rice god, Inari, who is a popular and charitable kami. Inari’s messenger and 
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guardian is the fox and therefore images and statues of the fox are always prominent at the 
god’s shrines (Littleton 2002: 26-27). The statues are dressed in red bibs for good fortune, 
and the Inari shrine is instantly recognisable for Japanese audiences because of the red 
painted Torii gates, red walls, and of course the fox statues (Ashkenazi 2003: 170). 
In another scene, one of the girls gets lost and sits down next to six Buddhist deities 
that are said to take care of all children (see Figure 3). An audience familiar with the 
symbolic meaning of the statues knows she will be safe (McCarthy 2002: 122). In Buddhism 
they are called ‘Boddhisattva’ (Ashkenazi 2003: 50), one of whose particular concerns is the 
roadways (and thus lost children) and represent the six Jizō, protecting the six destinies or 
classes of existence of the living being: the first destiny is that of the many gods that are 
living together in heaven, the second are the human beings, both good and bad, third are 
the Shuras, which are a class of spirits, fourth are the animals, both mythological and 
zoologically existing, the fifth and sixth destinies are those of the hungry ghosts (those who 







Figure 1. Mei and Satsuki pay their respects to a Sae-no-Kami, referred to in Japanese mythology as Dosōjin. 
  
Figure 2. Mei looks at an Inari Shrine. 
  
Figure 3. Mei sits down next to the Buddhist deities. 
During one scene (the 'bus stop' scene), Totoro offers the girls a gift of nuts and seeds. The 
girls decide to plant the seeds and wait until Totoro appears one night and performs a ritual. 
Within minutes giant trees grow out of the land and Totoro shows the girls the beautiful 
Japanese landscape, rice fields and forests. However, the next morning the trees are gone 
but the seeds did indeed sprout. The dream that wasn’t a dream was a gift from Totoro; 
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now the girls know what the effects of preserving nature can eventually accomplish. It is in 
a way a message: if you take good care of nature, something beautiful will come of it. The 
representation of Japanese culture, surroundings and traditions within the film has been 
thought about in every small detail. The trees, flowers and plants in the film are those that 
actually grow in Japan, Miyazaki states:  
I thought that if I tried to depict the plants with the least bit of exaggeration it 
 would no longer seem like Japan (1996:354).  
A natural phenomenon that happens from time to time in Japan is typhoons. The scene of a 
minor typhoon, gushing winds and a creaking house is a scene that all Japanese have 
experience with and can relate to. The film is very Japanese, not only in Shinto religion and 
the aspects of nature, but also in tradition; the shrines, sleeping on the ground, bowing for 
each other, having family baths, the older generation that still wears a kimono, eating with 
chopsticks and eating traditional Japanese meals. Furthermore, the Japanese scenery such 
as the rice fields, the farmers working on them with traditional gear and hats, and the 
Japanese style houses really add up to the cultural identity of this film.  
Gods, demons, and spirits: how Hayao Miyazaki depicts Japanese mythology 
Regardless of its historical Japanese context, this film too, is a perfect example of how 
culturally specific anime has become an economic success. However, Princes Mononoke is 
also an example of anime that has been adapted in order to 'remove' these same culturally 
specific boundaries and make the story plot more appealing to foreign audiences. For 
example, Daniela Pizzuto describes how Princess Mononoke's dubbed versions have been 
adapted in order to make the context of the film more appealing to foreign audiences 
(Pizutto 2018: 61-75). Princess Mononoke has been translated in English and included 
modifications to the original texts. According to Pizutto, the matter becomes even worse 
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when those English texts are translated from English, into another language - Italian, in this 
case (ibid: 63). 
 Therefore, it is important to explore the true intentions of Princess Mononoke and 
take distance from misconceptions about the film due misinterpretations. Among Miyazaki's 
work, the film Princess Mononoke can be read or understood as a traditional tale influenced 
by Japanese history, mythology and Shinto. Princess Mononoke was heavily influenced by 
revisionist historical works of Amino Yoshihiko,33 one of the most influential Japanese 
historians. Yoshihiko's research especially included the 'underappreciated' groups and tribes 
of Japanese history. Miyazaki chose to set the film in the Muromachi era (1392-1573), a 
time when the relationship between the people of Japan and nature was radically changing. 
Firearms were introduced and the ‘Iron Age’ was on its way (Wright 2005: 9). It was also a 
time of high culture in Japan and the time when the Zen aesthetic was developed in its 
cultural forms such as tea ceremonies and the Noh theatre (Wright 2005: 9).  In this film 
Miyazaki explores the marginals of history. He explains:  
It was in this period that people changed their value system from gods to money 
[…]. This is a film in which few samurai, peasants, or feudal lords appear […] the 
main protagonists are those who usually not do not appear on the stage of history. 
This is a story of the marginals of history (Bigelow 2009: 62). 
Miyazaki is referring to the Emishi people, a historical ‘non Yamato’ (non-Japanese) tribe. In 
history, they are described as the people who refused to accept the Yamato court rule 
during the late Nara and early Heian periods between the 7th and 10th century (Miyazaki 
2008: 15). In Princess Mononoke references to these historical events are made when the 
characters talk about the history of the Emishi. The Emishi people were seen by both the 
                                                             
33 Originally published in  1991 and 1993 with the titles Nihon no rekishi o yominaosu and Zoku nihon no rekishi 
o yominaosu. Translated in 2012 under the name Rethinking Japanese History.  
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Japanese and the Chinese as an uncivilised race (Varley 2000: 49). However, Miyazaki 
instead chose to convey the Emishi people as the 'guardians of ancient wisdom of the forest' 
(Bigelow 2009: 64).34 Princess Mononoke begins when a giant boar god, a kami of the 
forest, has turned into an Oni (demon); a reference to Shinto tradition, where one does not 
believe in absolute good or evil. This kami has become evil because of how humans have 
mistreated him and his forest. The movie involves Prince Ashitaka, who is infected by the 
evil poison of the demonic boar god and has to leave his village in order to find the forest 
kami that can cure him. He has to learn ‘Makoto no Kokoro’, which means ‘to see with eyes 
unclouded’ to be able to lift his curse. In Shinto philosophy the kami can only be 
experienced if one has a pure heart and mind (Bigelow 2009: 63). Whilst witnessing the 
horrible invasions of samurais that took place in the Muromachi Era he  eventually arrives in 
‘Iron City’, a gigantic fortress that is ruled by Lady Eboshi. She too is an example that 
Nothing is pure good or pure evil. Lady Eboshi on one hand is a kind woman, who tries to 
help people. She welcomes and provides for all kinds of people, including lepers and female 
prostitutes. Iron city is a rich city that is established in a holy forest that is protected by the 
forest gods. In order to make use of the land's iron sources Lady Eboshi tries to bring down 
the forest, and therefore, knowingly, also brings down the spirits that it is inhabiting. 
According to Miyazaki, many places in Japan have forests - or part of forests - that 
should not be entered. These are places that are usually feared by Japanese citizens, and as 
Miyazaki states many Japanese people still believe that some places are a world that doesn’t 
exist for humans (Miyazaki, 1996: 359). In Princess Mononoke Miyazaki created a forest that 
should not be entered by humans but was invaded by them after all, causing the balance of 
                                                             
34 Officially, there are no records that the Emishi culture survived; in fact, in the Muromachi era where the story 
of Princess Mononoke takes place, the Emishi people and culture had long been absorbed into the Japanese 
society. But Miyazaki used his creativity to create a story where a group of Emishi did survive and kept on living 
according to their traditional and cultural values in a hidden village.  
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nature to be disturbed. The forest Ashitaka needs to enter is full of obake (ghosts), which in 
this case are small, white creatures. These are Kodama obake (Odell and le Blanc 2009: 
108). The Yōkai (collective name for monsters and supernatural beings that are known in 
Japan) are invisible spirits that inhabit ancient trees. According to Richard Freeman, cutting 
down a tree where the kodama live can cause problems for the whole community (Freeman 
2010: 191). Like the sacred tree in My Neighbour Totoro, a sacred rope or Shimenawa is 
wound around the trunk of such a tree to prevent it from being harmed. The kodama can 
imitate human voices and in mythology play tricks on passing people (Freeman 2010: 191). 
Like in the legends, in Princess Mononoke the people fear them because it is said they will 
get you lost and once you go into these parts of the forests, you will never return. In My 
Neighbour Totoro the forest kami and obakes are visible for the girls, and these obake in 
Princess Mononoke can be seen by Ashitaka and the men he brought with him. It shows us 
that his intentions are pure, and he has a good heart. So, the kodama obake lead him 
through the heart of the forest instead of getting him lost. When Ashitaka arrives in Iron 
town he soon learns that this town is the source of all the problems and demonic gods in 
the forest. He also meets Princess Mononoke (San) and her wolf pack, with whom lady 
Eboshi is at war.  
 Things become critical when Lady Eboshi agrees to behead the most important forest 
kami, Shishigami, a deer with a human-like face that transforms at night and turns into a 
‘moonwalker’. It is the one spirit that keeps nature in balance. Shishigami has a lot of 
similarities to the Kirin, a creature often seen in Japanese Mythological art. Kirin is a 
mythical animal and a symbol of purity. He only appears to those who are pure at heart 
(Ashkenazi 2003: 118). Lady Eboshi is interested in wealth and believes that when the 
Shishigami  is dead, her people will have more land, thus more Iron and will become the 
wealthiest city. Her helpers are after his head for different reasons: their emperor believes 
that the head of the Shishigami will grant him immortality. The quest succeeds; the 
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Shishigami  head is indeed chopped off and the forest slowly is infected; Shishigami's blood 
has now become demonic blood that kills everything it touches. Shishigami keeps looking for 
his head in distress, causing decay and storms. Eventually, it is decided to return his head 
and Shishigami restores the balance of nature: the forest will start from the beginning and 
Iron town is destroyed. It is now covered in land and grass. But by doing so, the Shishigami 
had to use the last of his strength and eventually dies. It is now up to humankind and the 
remaining forest spirits to look after the balance of nature. In an interview in 1997, Miyazaki 
explains: 
I think that the Japanese did kill Shishigami around the time of the Muromachi era. 
And then we stopped being in awe of the forests […]. From ancient times up to a 
certain time in the medieval period, there was a boundary beyond which humans 
should never enter […] After Shishigami’s head was returned, nature regenerated. 
But it has become a tame, non-frightening forest of the kind we are accustomed to 
seeing. The Japanese have been remaking the Japanese landscape in this way 
(Wright 2005: 9).  
Princess Mononoke is an environmental film as well as a mythological tale; highly influenced 
by the most important belief in Shinto that spirits and gods work hand in hand with the 
natural world. They are a part of nature, and nature is a part of them. Without the kami,  
human existence will be in jeopardy.  
 Staying within the theme of mythology and supernaturalism, Spirited Away was an 
introduction to the supernatural side of Japan for many spectators.35 It is also the film that 
many scholars refer to as a introduction to anime for many new anime fans and a more 
mainstream public. Even though this film, again is very national in its context, the popularity 
                                                             
35 Japanorama series episode 6: Horror (BBC, Aired on 13 July 2002). 
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of Spirited Away worldwide also has to do with a successful marketing and branding 
campaign and international cooperation with Walt Disney Studios. By this international 
branding, Spirited Away too has lost some of its original resonances and deeper meaning 
because of the way the producers choose to adapt and distribute the film in the West. For 
this, I am borrowing the term 'Disneyfication' from scholar Laz Carter (Carter 2018: 47) as 
this is in fact the perfect term for what has been done to the original national identity of 
Spirited Away. This starts with the adaptation of the original title. Whereas the English title 
is simply 'Spirited Away', the Japanese title of the film explains a little of what the film is 
about for those who are familiar with Japanese folklore. Of the title Sen to Chihiro no Kami-
kakushi, ‘no Kami Kakushi’ means; 'Something hidden by the Kami'. James W. Boyd and 
Tetsuya Nishimura explain that there’s a Japanese expression Kami- Kakushi ni au, which 
means ‘To experience the Kami-Kakushi’ (Boyd and Nishimura 2004: 2). It refers to the 'folk 
designation of incidents' when someone is missing for a certain amount of time and there is 
no logical explanation. When the person returns (sometimes not remembering where he or 
she has been) the Japanese say that the person was ‘Hidden by the Kami’ (2004: 2). This is 
what happens to the main character, Chihiro and her parents. They become stuck in a spirit 
world of the kami, but also of many yōkai such as oni (demons) and obake (ghosts).  
 When it comes to branding, the original movie poster has undergone its own 
'Disneyfication' by removing text as well as emphasising the name of Hayao Miyazaki as the 
director to a larger extent (Carter 2018: 53). Furthermore, the complete layout of the poster 
has been simplified compared to the Japanese version, which can be seen in the Figure 4 
and 5, the Japanese version being on the left; 
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  Figure 4. Japanese poster for Spirited Away.  Figure 5. Western poster for Spirited Away.  
However, what I am trying to emphasise in this text is the representation of Shintoism and 
kami spirits that play a very important role in this film. And, with that, the references that 
became unclear or completely lost because of subbing, dubbing, or an audience being 
simply unfamiliar with Japanese mythology. To start off with, in the beginning of the film, 
Chihiro and her parents are driving through the woods and pass a torii. It is the same kind 
of gateway as also seen in My Neighbour Totoro. There are also tiny houses which are altars 
for the gods. The fact that Chihiro asks her mom what they are is an indication she has lost 
touch with tradition. Chihiro also sees Dosōjin in the woods; guardians that are there to 
protect travellers, and often indicate where the main road ends, as seen in My Neighbour 
Totoro. The family finds a gateway and decides to take a closer look; in front of the gateway 
there is another Dosōjin to indicate that the main road ends here. An audience familiar with 
these symbols will now know that perhaps this particular Dosōjin in front of a gateway 
indicates the gateway is a passage between the human and the spirit world. The parents 
decide to see where the gateway will lead them and end up in what they believe is an 
abandoned theme park. Strangely enough, a feast of delicious fresh food is prepared, and 
the parents decide to stuff themselves, which turns them into pigs. From that moment on, 
Chihiro is trapped in a world of the spirits. One of the first kami Chihiro sees wears 
traditional Zouman masks (see Figure 6). These kami are the Kasuga-sama, who in folklore 
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wear traditional clothes and masks. They are the kami of the Kasuga Shrine which is one of 
the most important shrines in Shinto religion. Ceremonies and rituals at this shrine located in 
Nara, Japan are often performed in the same traditional clothing and masks (Nakamaki 
2005: 68-69).  
 
Figure 6. Kami's in Zouman masks leave their ship in Spirited Away. 
After this encounter Chihiro meets the character Haku. Haku is a boy who turns out to be a 
white dragon Kami. Haku (which means ‘white’) is a dragon associated with water in 
Japanese folklore (Boyd and Nishimura 2004). This dragon is called Ryūjin (which means 
dragon person), also referred to as Ryu-Ō (dragon king). It is a kami that in Japanese 
mythology appears in dreams and is said to live in a palace in the sea or lakes. Like Haku in 
Spirited Away, ryūjin in mythology and Shinto have both good and bad sides. A ryūjin  is 
often described as a protector and a hero, but can also be a villain. In one of the 
mythological stories, Ryūjin steals a jewel and a bell from Kamatari, the founder of the 
Fujiwara clan (Ashkenazi 2003: 240-241). In Spirited Away, Haku helps others but also is a 
villain who steals a seal from Yubāba’s sister Zeniba. The character Haku once was a kawa 
no kami, a river god; he was the Kohaku river. The river was closed up by humans and 
covered with buildings; a reference to how nature has to make place for industrialisation 
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and how this effects the environment. According to an article written by Lucy Wright and 
Jerry Clode filling up the rivers is a common practice in Japan. Their article suggests that 
this is what has led Miyazaki to creating this part of Haku’s storyline (Wright and Clode 
2005: 51). The film in this way suggests that the river kami, or god Kohaku, had nowhere to 
go and therefore came to another Spirit world as a dragon who could adapt to a human 
form, where he forgot his true identity as a river kami; all because of the hands of humans. 
The character of Haku himself is a character that who a substantial part, can be missed out 
on by the non-Japanese speaking and the spectators unfamiliar with Japanese folklore. 
Especially in the English dubbed version, a substantial part of Haku’s character will 
disappear. Haku is a very traditional Japanese character. He is dressed in traditional gear 
that resembles the Japanese Heian period. According to Boyd and Nishimura (2004) what he 
wears is similar to a Hakama, which is a part of a Shinto priest’s formal costume. Haku's 
speech makes a good example of the risks of losing character and story by dubbing in a 
different language. In the original Japanese version, Haku's speech is very traditional and 
formal and reveals the fact that he might be an ancient creature. Boyd and Nishimura 
noticed that when Haku addresses Chihiro, he uses the ancient term 'Sonata'. Also Haku’s 
full name (which becomes clear near the end) is Nigihayami Kohaku-Nushi. His name is a 
reference in the Kojiki (the oldest extant book in Japanese) to 'Nigi Haya hi no Mikoto' which 
is the name of an ancestor to one of the families of high courtly ranks in ancient times 
(Boyd and Nishimura 2004).  
The inspiration and deeper meaning of Yūbaba's actions and creatures involved 
in Spirited Away  
In Spirited Away Chihiro gets a job in a public bathhouse accessible to all creatures of the 
spirit world. Public bathhouses are an important part of Japanese culture and making a film 
set in a bathhouse is something Miyazaki had been thinking about since his childhood when 
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he, as many Japanese children used to visit the public bathhouse himself (Mes 2002). The 
owner of the bathhouse is Yubāba, a name that also refers to ‘old hot water woman’ (Yu= 
'hot water', Bāba= old woman) (Boyd and Nishimura 2004). She is a witch and seems like a 
human-like Yokai with an enormous head. According to Noriko T. Reider in her article 
‘Spirited Away; Film of the Fantastic and Evolving Japanese Folk Symbols’ (2005: 11-14), the 
character of Yubāba is very similar to the Yokai Yamauba, a mountain witch from Japanese 
Mythology. Like Yamauba, Yubāba also has a very nurturing character towards her baby Bō. 
Yamauba in Japanese folktales is said to have supernatural powers and to give birth to 12 
children a year, one for each month of the year. She is evil and cannibalistic on one hand, 
but a nurturing mother on the other hand. Some of her children have magical powers or 
poses incredible strength (2005: 13). In one of the legends, Yamauba gives birth to Kintarō, 
a child that possessed great strength and power. The story goes that Kintarō was discovered 
by a great warrior, after which he changed his name to Sakata no Kintoki. Together with the 
warrior and three of his other newfound guardians they defeated many Yokai demons. In 
the legends Kintaro is often portrayed wearing a red harakake (a bib or apron) with his 
name’s character (the character for ‘Kin’) printed on it. According to Reider, in other folk 
tales from the 18th and 19th century Yamauba often expresses herself saying that her son is 
her only pleasure in life (2005: 11-14). As also described by Reider, like Yamauba’s child, Bō 
also wears a red harakake with his name’s character printed on it. The baby is of incredible 
strength and size, and Yubāba protects him beyond normal standards. For these characters, 
the inspiration of the Japanese folktales about Yamauba and her powerful offspring(s) has 
been used. Yubāba steals the names of her employees to gain power over them. If they lose 
their name, they slowly forget who they are and will lose their true identity (Miyazaki, 2008: 
198). Boyd and Nishimura (2004) explain that Chi means ‘1000’ and Hiro means 'inquire, 
fathom, or look for'. They conclude that the meaning of the name Chihiro is 'Looking 
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deeply', or 'inquiring after many things'. When Yubāba gives Chihiro the name Sen, it is also 
an alternate reading for the same written character. 
 Yūbaba’s helpers (see Figure 7) are known in Japanese folklore as the Mai Kubi 
(Freeman 2010: 30). This means ‘the dancing heads’. According to Richard Freeman, the 
myth of the dancing heads goes back to the period of the Kangen Emperor between 1243 
and 1247. It was a period where a military government of samurai ruled Japan. One day 
three wicked samurai met each other, they were Kosanta, Matashige and Akugoro. From the 
day they met, they absolutely hated each other. They argued and drew their swords; it 
became a battle in which they all literally lost their heads. They hated each other so much, 
that even with the heads decapitated from the body, the heads still kept on fighting and 
arguing. Their heads rolled into the sea, where they still fight until this day. At midnight they 
come to the surface of the sea, where they dance (or rather bounce) on the water, causing 
the waves in the sea, while shouting at each other (2010: 209). 
 
Figure 7. Yūbaba's Mai Kubi helpers in Spirited Away.   
 In one of the scenes in Spirited Away,  supposedly, a 'stink god' enters the 
bathhouse  and all characters are disgusted by his dirt and stench. Chihiro gets the order to 
wash him and discovers a thorn in the stink god’s body. It turns out to be the handle of a 
bike, and when the bike comes loose, all the pollution comes out; old household appliances, 
scrap metal and other detritus. It turns out the creature was a river god which had been 
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polluted so much by the humans that this is what he became. During a press conference in 
Paris in 2001, Miyazaki explains how they came up with this scene.36 Just as Nausicaä of the 
Valley of the Wind was also inspired by the writers and the Ghibli staffs' personal experience 
with the pollution, Miyazaki says of this particular scene in Spirited Away: 
It doesn’t come from mythology, but from my own experience. There is a river close 
to where I live in the countryside. When they cleaned the river, we got to see what 
was at the bottom of it, which was truly putrid. In the river there was bicycle, with its 
wheel sticking out above the surface of water. So I thought it would be easy to pull 
out, but it was terribly difficult because it had become so heavy from all the dirt it 
had collected over the years [...] the smell of what they dug up was really awful. 
Everyone had just been throwing stuff into that river over the years, so it was an 
absolute mess (Miyazaki in Paris, 2001). 
Another character in Spirited Away is the mysterious black figure that goes by the name of 
Kao Nashi, which means ‘no face’.37 The mask Kao Nashi is wearing is a traditional Noh 
Okina mask that is used in traditional Japanese Noh theatre. There’s a Japanese expression, 
'someone is like a Noh mask' (Reider 2005: 20). It means that someone is inscrutable; it is 
hard to know what the person feels, wants or is thinking. In Spirited Away the mask Kao 
Nashi is wearing symbolises very inscrutable creature that only Chihiro seems to understand.  
  
                                                             
36 During the animation festival 'Nouvelles images du Japon', Paris. 
37 The character does not come from Japanese folklore but was born out of Miyazaki’s imagination (Miyazaki 
2008:206). Koa Nashi seems to be lonely and tries to connect with Chihiro. He keeps offering her gold, but 
Chihiro doesn’t need it. Meanwhile, others happily accept his gold and the Obake soon becomes an object of 
interest. Everyone becomes greedy and this greed turns the Obake into something evil. According to Miyazaki, 
there is a bit of No Face in all of us (2008:212). The greediness becomes the Obake himself, and he turns into a 




It is clear that Studio Ghibli is the most famous anime production companies. And whilst 
being an international soft power, long before anime was seen as such by the Japanese 
government, is still known for its productions often representing the cultural and national 
identity of Japan. Within anime, Ghibli created a way for culturally specific themes to be 
accepted and welcomed internationally. Ghibli films have not become economically 
successful solely because of the way they were made, but are also a perfect example of 
commercialised transnational anime that includes huge promotional campaigns and 
sponsors. Ghibli films fall in the category of 'accented' cinema: the films are highly cultural, 
but have also been translated in various languages. This has often resulted in changes to 
the context of the films. In this chapter, I have explored the 'lost' national and cultural 
symbols that come with engaging to a foreign audience. I have also explored Miyazaki's 
films as examples of a soft power, products that are internationally commercialised but also 
deeply national in their context.  
 With examples, I have shown how the national identity of the films can cause a 
difference in the perception of the films when they travel. However, the cultural references 
within the films do not keep a Western audience from enjoying Studio Ghibli's work. The 
films can be enjoyed by a wide range of audiences, but for an older or culturally engaged 
Japanese audience there is less need for the spectators to explore the meaning behind the 
storyline of the films because it is deeply embedded in their culture. Shinto for example, has 
been part of the Japanese culture for at least 2000 years and its traditions are still practiced 
by 80% of the Japanese today (Littleton 2011: 13). Although these films are indeed 
transnational in their reach to a global audience via distribution and exhibition practices, this 
chapter has argued that the film texts are specifically Japanese and produced for the 
national audience. The anime of Ghibli and Miyazaki in particular, is deeply national cinema 
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and my intention was thus to explore the national elements of the films which are often 
overlooked or misinterpreted by Western audiences.  
 This chapter incorporated the theoretical framework of Mette Hjort, Stephen Croft 
and Andrew Higson, which allowed me to show the apparent national and cultural identity of 
the films and to create a clear overview of the deeper meaning behind the films. Stephen 
Croft’s reconceptualises national cinema and divides the concept of the national into 
different varieties (2006: 45). The films of Miyazaki are indeed national films that completely 
ignore Hollywood in their Japanese cultural and national identity. However, many Studio 
Ghibli films are now distributed by Disney in the West, and original voices are dubbed by 
star voices for distribution purposes. The original film texts are translated, sometimes 
adapted in order to engage a foreign audience. Using examples of the character Haku in 
Spirited Away, I have shown that dubbing or subtitling can make a difference in the 
perception of a film and can contribute to the loss of (cultural) identity. Another variety 
Crofts mentions is the national cinema whose culture and language take their distance from 
the nation states which enclose them (2006: 45). This chapter has demonstrated that the 
cultural and national identity of Miyazaki’s films is very much Japanese, with an awareness 
of a Japanese audience and many references to the Japanese religions, traditions and 
culture. One of Higson’s theories about national cinema is that national identity is about the 
experience of belonging to a community; all the rituals, practises, and cultural characteristics 
involved (2006: 16). The community director Hayao Miyazaki comes from is the Japanese 
one. It is therefore no surprise that Miyazaki incorporates his own cultural identity into his 
work without an apparent awareness of an international audience. The films are, using 
Higson’s terms, products of Miyazaki’s own nationhood, with an authentic identity, 
references and symbols to the Japanese cultural history and practises. 
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 One of the other subjects discussed in this chapter is the environmental problem that 
plays a huge role in many Ghibli films. My overall conclusion is that the environmental 
subjects implemented in the films are influenced by two different points of view. The first 
one is the personal point of view of the director: Miyazaki’s experience with pollution. The 
films are in a way also a campaign to take better care of the environment. And secondly, 
there is a spiritual point of view, the Shinto ideology of the relationship between nature and 
humans. However, referring back to Studio Ghibli's work in the context of national cinema, 
the subjects of the discussed films go further than just the environmental issues. The 
creators attempt to look at both the issues and the beauty of their own culture and the 
history of their nation. The films are an ode to the Shinto and Buddhist way of life and the 
associated symbols and philosophies are of great influence for the films discussed in this 
chapter. I can conclude that the discussed films of are creations of their directors' mind, but 
are indeed influenced by a personal national background and are greatly inspired by 
Shintoism, indigenous Japanese folk symbols and Japanese beliefs, customs, thoughts and 
practices. The films may attract a broad international audience and certainly are a source of 





Chapter 4. Neo-nationalism and pacifism in anime 
The rise of Japanese popular culture, and therein anime, was one that was simultaneous 
with the economic growth of Japan after years of recession (Saito 2013: 35). As suggested 
earlier in this thesis, anime has not just become a soft power because the Japanese 
government decided so; it was a source of soft power long before that. Anime's soft power 
plays a huge role on an economic level. What I am suggesting in this chapter is that it can 
also be a medium that inspires discussion and debate (having a 'power' in the sense of 
getting spectators to think about certain issues or taboos). With the Cool Japan scheme now 
set in place, I also argue that some anime offer  a major contrast to the image that the 
Japanese government is trying to create globally (and with the help of that same medium: 
anime).  
 With major historical events in mind, as well as the aftermath of more recent events 
(for example, the earthquake and tsunami on the 11th March 2011, causing the nuclear 
power plant accident in Fukushima), questions have arisen about the critical role of popular 
media such as anime in contemporary Japanese society (Berndt 2012: 149). Some of the 
works in anime reflect common beliefs in Japan and anxieties about Japanese national 
identity; they unite Japan’s cultural identity on both a personal and emotional level (2013: 
35). In a sense, the rise of Japanese anime and popular cultural has reframed the (foreign) 
perceptions of Japan as well. Anime can be a (political or economic) tool to portray Japan 
and its uniqueness to foreign markets, and most of all, enhance the 'marketability' of 
Japanese culture. At the same time, the 'collective' national memories of the Japanese also 
consists of ideologies about Japan's history. Prime Minister Shinzō Abe himself has been 
known for his nationalistic, somewhat clichéd and bombastic views of Japanese history, as 
one can conclude from the various news updates surrounding Abe's policies.38 Abe’s denial 
                                                             
38 For example, in The Japan Times article 'Identifying the 'liberal' in Japanese politics', Oct. 21, 2017.  
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of Japanese war crimes in World War II has caused much criticism worldwide and director 
Miyazaki, for example, has expressed his disapproval. Looking at anime from these points of 
view, it is important to mention anime that is in contrast to the ideologies of the Japanese 
government, and the influence in some works of what (according to academics and 
journalists) can be referred to as neo-nationalism and pacifism. This also leads me to the 
debate of how influential anime exactly is on a political and social-economic level. As I argue 
in this chapter, the storylines used in anime can cause major uproar and debate on many 
platforms: among Japanese citizens, internationally, by political Japan, by artists and by 
production companies themselves.  
 The 1990s in particular can be referred to as the years of Japan's neo-nationalism: 
the resurgence of nationalism by the Liberal Democratic Party, constitutional reforms and 
legislative calls for re-militarization (Saito 2013: 37). On the other hand, pacifism - more 
specifically, peace nationalism (where one is devoted to protecting the status and the 
ideology of a peaceful nation) was a growing trend as well. This translated into two 
structures to be found in Japan’s national identity that are portrayed through mass media 
(and especially manga and anime): pacifism and militarism (McVeigh: 2004). For a long 
time, pacifism has been an intrinsic part of Japan’s national identity and has distinguished 
Japan from other countries. After the Cold War, the Japanese government took pride in 
restraining its military forces more than other countries did (Gustafsson, Hagström and 
Hanssen 2018: 138). With new policies, presented by the Japanese government as their soft 
power policies, the Japanese government is currently trying to reaffirm Japan’s identity as a 
peace-loving country by using popular culture (among other strategies). Many scholars 
describe Japan's Prime Minister Shinzō Abe’s character and policies as essentially pacifist, 
whilst others claim that Japan’s pacifism is crumbling (Gustafsson et al 2018: 138). On the 
other hand, as described by Gustafsson, Hagström and Hanssen: 
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 Abe’s attack on Japan’s relative pacifism, as both a policy and an identity, has been 
 so forceful and effective that we believe the time has come to declare Japan’s 
 pacifism dead (Gustafsson et al 2018: 138). 
When looking at anime, Japan's wartime past has been portrayed in various ways, both 
referring to the recent decades as well as to the much further past (for example in Hayao 
Miyazaki's Princess Mononoke). In a sense, anime productions can be an introduction to 
Japan's war-time history and can even been seen as a historical text (Mizuno 2007). 
Referring to a more recent past, for example, is the movie Grave of the Fireflies (Hotaro no 
Haka, dir: Isao Takahata, Japan, 1988). Grave of the Fireflies is an incredibly tragic film that 
has been based on the partly autobiographical story of Akiyuki Nosaka, who was separated 
from his family during the war and left with the care of his stepsister, who eventually passed 
away due to malnutrition (Goldberg 2009: 39). It is set in the city of Kobe during World War 
II in 1945. The plot follows the suffering of a young boy and his toddler-sister, who have no 
parents and have been abandoned by others, trying to survive. This movie was released 
simultaneously with Miyazaki's My Neighbour Totoro but was in many ways very different 
from the 'happy go lucky' feeling that's left after watching Totoro. Instead, Grave of the 
Fireflies leaves a feeling of sadness and emptiness; of witnessing an almost autobiographical 
event with which the older Japanese generation can still identify.  
 The anime series Space Battleship Yamato (Uchū senkan Yamato, dir: Leij 
Matsumoto, Japan, 1977) is a completely different example of an anime referring to Japan’s 
Cold War and post–Cold War periods and invokes, according to scholar Hiromi Mizuno, 
'nostalgia, glory, and an alternative reality by utilizing the image of Yamato', and deals with 
a fantasy of post-war Japan where the 'pacifist constitution renounces war' (Mizuno 2007: 
105). As is the case with Grave of the Fireflies, though seemingly very different in scenery 
and plot, the underlying desire of the anime is survival and stability in a time of war.  
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 In 2013 the last movie of director Hayao Miyazaki, The Wind Rises (Kaze Tachinu) 
was released. It was received with praise by audiences, but also faced a lot of criticism (for 
example, in the article 'Swan Song Too Hawkish for Some' by Brooks Barnes in The New 
York Times [2013]). The film depicts the youth of the 1930s and is a tribute to aircraft 
designer Jiro Horikoshi (Gunma, Japan, 1903 - 1982) and also, his Italian forerunner Gianno 
Caproni, who was his inspiration in the film, and also one of Miyazaki's idols. Horikoshi made 
history with his famous Mitsubishi A6M1, which later became the Navy type 0 carrier fighter. 
The 'Zero' fighter has left a mark on aviation history. These planes took part in the attack on 
Pearl Harbor and in kamikaze missions (McCurry 2013). Before this, Horikoshi designed 
various other fighting planes and carrier attack planes for Mitsubishi. The Zero fighter was 
used as a warplane from 1940 to 1943. In the film not the war only is a part of the story, 
but also the great depression in Japan, unemployment, poverty, sickness (tuberculosis), 
revolutions, fascism, and of course, not having freedom of speech, whilst at the same time 
modern and (at the time) popular culture was flourishing (Miyazaki 2014: 8). In the film, 
Horikoshi is devoted to making the best airplane, aware that it will be used for the war 
regardless of the consequences. Although there is a lot of hesitation and doubt in the main 
character, he still chooses to set his doubts aside and to pursue his dream of making the 
best airplane, even though his design was 'captured' by the military. Of course, one can 
expect to be criticised when romanticising a story about a plane design that has caused so 
much terror. However, Miyazaki (who loved airplanes since his childhood) stated he just 
wanted to portray a 'devoted individual who pursued his dreams head on’ (Miyazaki 2014: 
8). But swaying towards beauty, as Miyazaki states, may come with a price (ibid). In a 
sense, the underlying message of the film is an anti-military one, brought to the spectator 
by various events and the main character's doubts in a time of war, the choices he has to 




 The movie was a box-office hit in Japanese cinemas, grossing $120 million in ticket 
sales.. The sensitivity about the theme of the film is, as critics argue, that it has a strong 
pacifist message and is 'a biopic of Jiro Horikoshi, an aeronautical engineer whose 
contribution to the world was a killing machine' (Barnes: 2013). Arguably, what is portrayed 
in the film is - however controversial - a plausible view of the doubt that Horikoshi might 
have had in a time of war, which has been portrayed very subtly by Miyazaki. It shows that 
in wartime, values and survival don't always collide. Even so, both the film studios and 
Miyazaki have been attacked by Japanese pacifists for their 'film tribute' to a war plane 
designer. Miyazaki, who is openly against the constitutional reform of Japan, was called an 
'anti-Japanese' traitor because the movie focussed on 'the nonsense' of the war (McCurry 
2013). On top of this, Miyazaki wrote an essay that was published simultaneously with the 
film's release, condemning Japan's modern-day drift to the right, criticising Abe's plans of  to 
revise Japan's pacifist constitution (McCurry 2013). In South-Korea, the film was not only 
denounced because of it being a tribute to a 'boogieman' as one might say, but also 
because in reality, the airplanes were assembled by forced labourers from the Korean 
Peninsula, to which Miyazaki responded in 2013:  'He (Horikoshi) was someone who resisted 
demands from the military [...] I wonder if he should be liable for anything just because he 
lived in that period.' (McCurry 2013) 
Miyazaki's father, in fact, had been one of the assemblers of military airplanes during the 
war. Arguably, his message in this film is also a message that one's actions are influenced 
by the situation that surrounds them during a time of war. It is striking that an anime film 
can lead to so much debate in Japan and surrounding countries. As for film director Hayao 
Miyazaki, it certainly complicates his public persona.  
 The responses to The Wind Rises are also a result and an example of the alternative 
versions of historical memory that the Japanese (both in the political landscape as civilians) 
are dealing with. Many regions in Japan are often cultivating local identities which are based 
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upon different versions of (local) history. Memories and stories of individuals as well as the 
portrayal of artefacts in museums and tourist places are built on popularized versions of 
history and historical recollection or 'historical memory' (Hirano, Saaler and Säbel 2017: 
247). This means that the Japanese identity is divided and based on different versions of 
Japanese history, hence the fact that a film such as The Wind Rises can cause so much 
uproar and tensions between the 'advocates' of different versions of (a wartime) history. 
Firstly, there is the progressive view which denounces Japanese History up to and including 
World War Two as an expression of imperialist aggression (Hirano et al 2017: 258-259). 
Secondly, there is the (neo)liberalist view, which is propagated by conservative circles, who 
attempt to establish national pride by reinterpreting its modern history (ibid). 'Liberalism' is 
a collection of concepts deriving from the ideas such as Immanuel Kant in the 17th and 18th 
centuries. In the 20th century, the current liberalistic view has been developed by idealists 
such Woodrow Wilson . After the First World War, Wilson (and many other idealists) were 
determined to change the system so that things like the war would not happen again in the 
future. Since the end of the Cold War from 1947 to 1991 Neo-Liberalism became a 
movement within liberalism (Vyas 2011: 20). Liberalism stands for freedom of choice, 
individualistic freedom (without limiting the freedom of others) and generally, having the 
feeling of security, with civil rights and limited governmental and state restrictions (2011: 
20-26). Within Neo-liberalism the government does not (or, very limited) control or interfere 
with the economy. The government distances itself from all services that can be provided by 
the public sector, creating space for free trade, as well as economic and individual freedom 
and growth. (Neo)liberalists often do not consider military power to be the most important 
source of power, but also believe in individualism which can reside in individuals, companies 
and other 'actors' that might be formed by these individuals or companies- and how they 
pursue their relationships (ibid: 20-22). This also explains Abe's and his party’s liberalist 
views, focusing on popular culture (among other sources) as a main source of soft power. 
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Lastly, there is also the 'Shiba' view of history which looks at the positive aspects of the Meiji 
period (until 1905) when Japan was seen as a progressive country open to social reforms 
(Hirano et al 2017: 247-277).  
 Over 30 years ago, the anime film Akira (dir: Katsuhiro Otomo, 1988, Japan) was 
released. It has since been a huge cult hit and one of the most famous anime films ever 
made (Napier 2007: 40). The film is an apocalyptic and futuristic view of so called 'Neo' 
Tokyo and portrays the city in a future after World War Three (which in the film takes place 
in the year 2019). The war was started after what was believed to be a nuclear bomb 
explosion in Tokyo. However, the explosion was actually caused by a supernatural child 
called Akira, a boy whose supernatural powers were created by the government’s 
experiments with telekinesis. The streets are roamed by violent gangs of bikers, there is 
poverty, terror, government oppression and protests. The main character of the movie is 
Tetsuo, who is part of one of the motorcycle gangs. He grew up in an orphanage and finds 
out he has telekinetic powers, as well. After Tetsuo discovers his powers, he is captured by 
the government but manages to escape, after which he decides to use his powers to destroy 
the military complex in Tokyo (which in the film is responsible for locking up people with 
'abilities') and destroying huge parts of 'Neo' Tokyo, including the military force that tries to 
stop him. As critics suggest, the movie is a reference to the nuclear bombs dropped by the 
United States during World War II, the character Akira being the metaphorical 
representation of the bomb and Tetsuo a metaphorical forerunner of calamities that still 
might happen (Chu, 2018). When Akira was released in 1988, Japan had reached its post-
war peak of international influence and surrounding countries felt threatened by what they 
saw as Japan's superpower status (Napier 2007: 40) The government is omnipresent in 
Akira, whilst on the opposite side citizens of 'Neo' Tokyo portray the feeling of 
powerlessness. At some point, these roles are reversed, and the government can no longer 
control the destructive telekinetic outbursts of Tetsuo.  
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 Akira does not have a happy ending, but in fact has an open ending where the 
spectator is left with the completely destroyed sightings of 'Neo' Tokyo and main character 
Tetsuo vanishing and turning into a white light - or rather, a new existence or entity, and 
stating 'I am Tetsuo'. Arguably, the statement is referring to Tetsuo's coming to terms with 
who he now is - and the situation he has created as a god-like creature. The film is 
grotesque, and scenes are so well-drawn that they are sometimes even difficult to look at 
when the main character Tetsuo in transforming or morphing into something post-human . 
Still, I would argue that even though the movie obviously shows a fantastic and over-
exaggerated future, it is a representation of a national memory and feelings that are left 
after the World War II bombing of Hiroshima (on August 6, 1945) and Nagasaki (3 days 
later), which in Hiroshima wiped out an astonishing 90 percent of the city and killed 
approximately 80,000 people. In Nagasaki, approximately 40,000 people were killed. Up to 
this day, the effects of radiation are still noticeable and due to the long-term effects of 
radiation, many more people have died in the aftermath or are still coping with strange 
unexplainable health problems and cancers. These bombings were also the reason to 
announce Japan’s surrender to the US only a few days after the horrific events and have left 
a huge scar on Japanese (and world) history (Yagami 2009: 301-307). Akira might be a 
fictional film, but the terror that is portrayed throughout the film is not even that far from 
the wartime horrors that happened in reality - and are still an underlying threat in modern 
times. Mass killing is still commonly used as a war tactic and is - and has been - used by 
almost all major powers. In a time of war, the government's decision to take thousands of 
lives is a very realistic one (for example, in an earlier event in March 1945, the United States 
air forces alone already killed 80,000 to 100,000 civilians in Tokyo (Yagami 2009: 306). An 
atomic bomb such as in Akira or airstrikes such as in The Wind Rises at a time of war are 
'just' another weapon to use as a force of military power.  
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 Japanese cinema has been representing the trauma of the atomic bombings long 
before Akira or The Wind Rises. It has been a theme that has been used since the 1950s, 
for example in Godzilla. As discussed in previous chapters, the Godzilla films have become a 
precursor to contemporary soft power; a product of Japan that is known and 'adopted' 
around the globe. Apart from Gojira/ Godzilla being a popular character and a famous 
subject of merchandise from Japan, the films also are a response to America's wartime 
aggression and nuclear bombings. The filmmaker’s original intentions were thus not only to 
make a monster action movie- but also to make an anti-war and anti-nuclear film (Miyamoto 
2016: 1091). Gojira is a monster, but he is also a victim of radiation exposure from nuclear 
tests. In that sense, his destructive capabilities are a direct result of human mistakes, and 
represent the mass destruction of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, Gojira also raises 
sympathy and stands for the victims of nuclear weapons, as he himself is a victim too, which 
raises sympathy for the creature (2016: 1091). Furthermore, Gojira also represents the 
disruption of man and nature, which plays an important role in Japanese culture and in 
Shintoism, Japan's largest religion (which I discussed in more depth in chapter 3).  
 What Godzilla, Akira and The Wind Rises have in common is that they all portray an 
(artistic) interpretation of  how citizens  might act and feel in a time of war, what can 
happen to a society and its values, mass destruction and feelings of powerlessness such as 
many have experienced during the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. 
Secondly, I argue that the national background of the directors of the abovementioned 
works have influenced the storylines and portrayal of history in the films. Arguably, what 
these films demonstrate is that (as is the case with many Hollywood films, too) Japanese 
film and/or anime can be a form of (mass) entertainment, but at the same time can be very 
nationalistic, often falling back on national traumas and memories in.  
 A similar case is the Barefoot Gen series. The manga Barefoot Gen (Hadashi no Gen, 
1973- 1974) was originally created by cartoonist Keiji Nakazawa and was made into three 
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live action films in 1976, 1977 and 1980. It also became commonly known as an anime film 
(directed by Mori Masaki in 1983 and a second film by Toshio Hirata in 1986). Original 
manga artists Keiji Nakazawa based the story plot loosely on his own experiences with the 
atomic bomb. When Nakazawa was six years old, the atomic bomb was dropped on his 
hometown, Hiroshima. At the time Nakazawa only lived about a mile from the bombing, and 
many of his relatives lost their lives both at the time of the bombing and in later years, due 
the consequences of radiation. Barefoot Gen (the anime, live action films and the original 
manga) is about living as a child during the wartime in Hiroshima and the events that took 
place before, during and after the bombing are portrayed in great detail. The story is even 
used as a recourse in Japan to educate young people about the nuclear war and has been 
used in school libraries since 1980 (Nakazawa 2001: 124). It also condemns militarist 
leadership, which makes Barefoot Gen a pacifist story, opposed to war, militarism, or 
violence.  
 What is striking about Barefoot Gen is that it was the first Japanese manga that 
became internationally known due to the actions of a Japanese-American peace movement 
(Berndt 2012: 148), who fought for the translation of the  Barefoot Gen manga series into 
English due its important message, and succeeded in their quest in 1978. The non-profit 
organisation 'Project Gen' was formed in 1976 by both Japanese and American citizens living 
in Tokyo. So far, they have managed to translate the first four volumes of the manga into 
English, followed by translations in French, German, Swedish, Norwegian, Esperanto, 
Indonesian, and Tagalog (Nakazawa 2001: 124). However, in the current era, Barefoot Gen 
has not escaped criticism either. Even if it was 'just' a comic, it has been used as a historical 
reference used to educate the young generation. But since the disaster in Fukushima, critics 
argue that Barefoot Gen in its storyline did not raise enough critical awareness about the 
dangers of nuclear power plants, and was not suitable as a historical reference (Berndt 
2012: 148). This is remarkable, because the manga was never intended for such wider 
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educational purposes. Placing this responsibility on a manga, arguably, is somewhat 
ludicrous. However, since the recent debates surrounding Barefoot Gen there have been 
discussions arguing that the Fukushima accident needs to be 'exhaustively understood' 
before it can used in manga or anime (2012: 159). This leads me back to the debate of how 
anime can be of influence on a socio-economic level. On the contrary, scholar Jaqueline 
Berndt argues:  
 Contemporary manga (and anime) fans privilege a kind of media consumption that 
 is less about deep meaning which may be unpacked by intellectuals, than about 
 economic, sensory (or even sensual) and cultural impacts. In this connection, manga 
 and anime series are appreciated for the relationalities they trigger (2012: 159). 
But even if this is the case, anime can be the subject of public and political debate. Which 
raises concerns and questions about the future of artistic freedom in Japan, and to what 
extent the government can influence creative industries and what is produced.  
 Anime directors and productions companies might still choose to portray the 'other' 
Japan which could, as becomes clear from this chapter, cause friction in the way Japan 
wishes to portray itself. In addition to these debates, it is important to acknowledge that in 
January 2012 the Creative Industries Division of METI (Ministry of Economy, Trade and 
Industry) in Japan launched the Cool Japan Strategy, in which the strategy to 'Capitalize on 
the popularity of 'Cool Japan'' was thoroughly described and aimed to accomplish: 1) 
unearthing of domestic demand,  2) incorporation of foreign demand, and 3) transformation 
of industrial structure. The aim of this was, according to the report, to secure new income 
sources and jobs, leading to regional economic revitalization (METI 2012: 4). The Cool 
Japan slogan itself has not only been discussed from the points of view of popular culture 
and creative industries, but also from a point of view of nationalism and nation-building 
(Valaskivi 2013: 1). Part of the Cool Japan strategy, as described in this publication, is the 
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'Japan Mother Program' which is aimed towards publicity based on Japan’s culture. It also 
states that the programme was formed to 'edit knowledge' as the source of Cool Japan, 
collecting stories about the revival of 'the mother country' Japan as the 'Japan knowledge 
code', 'World knowledge code' and 'Asian knowledge code'- in order to 'record and distribute 
stories of Japan and re-edit Japan’s industry, culture and economy'. (2012: 18). On the 
other hand, the same report states that freedom of expression and tolerance (along with 
communication nodes and investors) are essential in order to attract creative human 
resources, information, and capital (2012: 20).  
 When looking at Japanese anime, the economic support of Japanese products of soft 
power resulted in the funding of various productions. However, regardless of whether this is 
intentional or not, none of them involve sensitive issues such as nuclear bombings, the 
economy or other subjects that might cause public debate or uproar. For example, in 2012 
METI funded Toei Animation's and 20th Century Fox's new Dragonball Z film Battle of Gods 
(Kami to Kami, Dir: Masahiro Hosoda, 2012, Japan/ USA) with approximately $636.000 US 
dollars in order to support the international efforts of Japanese filmmakers (a collaboration 
with the United States, in this case) (Komatsu 2012). As harmless as the funding of 
Dragonball Z  might seem, intended to strengthen international bonds, it seems that critics 
as well as fans argue about the propaganda of 'pro-active' pacifism in other government 
funded anime productions (Brummer 2016).39 As stated in 2016 in The Diplomat by scholar 
Matthew Brummer: 
 To sell the image of a non-threatening Self-Defence Forces (JSDF) at home and 
 abroad [...] Tokyo has and will continue to utilize a web of affective cultural and 
 entertainment  resources – the Creative Industrial Complex (CIC) – to influence 
 perceptions of Japan’s military establishment. The alignment between the CIC and 
                                                             
39 For example, it has been discussed forums such as Reddit and Anime News Network. 
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 the JSDF is nuanced, storied, and important for understanding both how Japan 
 sees its own defence identity and how the international community sees Japan’s 
 military (Brummer 2016).  
One of the popular anime (and manga) series that has been funded by CIC, is the fantasy 
series Gate (Gate: Jieitai Kano Chi nite, Kaku Tatakaer, dir: Takumi Yanai, 2006-2009, 
Japan). The series is not only funded, but also completely produced and designed according 
how the JSDF (Japanese Self Defence Forces) wishes to portray themselves and is in line 
with certain guidelines, portraying a perfect and heroic image of Japan. The plot involves a 
group of JSDF soldiers who are protecting Japan from 'alien' invasion by using Japan’s 
modern and state of the art defence technologies. According to critics, the story represents 
contemporary Japanese security-related issues, normalizing and familiarizing the audiences 
with Japan's armed forces (2016).  
 However, (military) nationalism in anime is not something new and certainly not 
something unusual either. When it comes to portraying the power of military forces and 
romanticising self defence forces, Hollywood, such as briefly compared earlier in this text 
with Gojira, has a history of films that involve certain forms of military propaganda too. For 
example, when taking a closer look at the films and comics of the Marvel Universe or films 
based on the heroes of DC Comics, one might come to the same conclusion. The important 
difference is that in Japan's case, certain productions such as Gate are (openly) influenced, 
restricted by certain guidelines and funded by the government, which makes spectators  and 
critics wary and sceptical of how much artistic freedom these projects actually really have - 
and of course, on how much the government is in control of what is published in order to 




Conclusion   
In this chapter I focussed on the rise of anime and explored how neo-nationalism and 
pacifism play a role in anime. Secondly, I examined the role of anime in the contemporary 
Japanese society as well as for the Japanese economy and political perspectives. With 
examples, I have shown that the collective national memories of the Japanese also consist 
of ideologies about Japan's history, which causes not only political and public debate, but 
also causes discussions about anime and media productions that might each portray their 
own versions of Japanese history. Anime has not only become an important economic 
product, but has also become important on a political and social-economic level. In Japan, 
both pacifism and militarism are portrayed though mass-media.  
 Anime is often an introduction to Japan's wartime history, but can face a lot of 
criticism, as I have shown by looking in more depth at Miyazaki's The Wind Rises, for 
example. By using examples of anime productions, I have shown that the Japanese identity 
is divided and based on different versions of Japanese history; a progressive view as well as 
a (neo)liberal view. Through exploring productions such as Akira, Gojira and Barefoot Gen, I 
have shown examples of anime and popular media that contain a metaphorical 
representation of the national memory and traumas after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki in 1945, proving that anime can have a deeper meaning and can be the 
subject of public and political debate. In the context of the ‘Cool Japan strategies’, I have 
identified the challenges and issues that arise from governmental interference of popular 
media:  the strategy was set up to capitalize on the popularity of 'Cool Japan'. However, as 
becomes clear in this chapter, the government simultaneously is using popular media to 
portray nationalism and nation-building and, more importantly, edit the national as well as 
international knowledge about Japan. Economic support of Japanese products of soft power 
resulted in the funding of various productions, which has led to debates in regard to artistic 
freedom and propaganda in government funded anime productions. 
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Chapter 5. International anime fandom and subculture  
In contrast with earlier chapters, which are focused on the political and economic status of 
anime and the cultural identity of anime, this chapter focuses on the commercialisation of 
anime by looking at international markets and the subcultures that have derived from 
anime: Comic-cons, otaku subculture,40 and global anime fandom. Having established some 
parameters for understanding what cultural and national identity is with regards to anime as 
a product, this chapter explores anime further as a (sub)cultural phenomenon. This chapter 
shows that anime culture is, indeed, a form of soft power on its own: anime culture has 
become a 'business card' for Japan, making Japan and Japanese products more attractive 
and more popular worldwide. 
The rise of anime from a Dutch perspective   
Whilst growing up in the Netherlands (which therefore will be my starting point), I was first 
introduced to anime as a child in the 80s and early 90s. Back then, anime was not labelled 
as such or even as Japanese - they were just cartoons. Therefore, not being aware of what 
anime or 'otaku' culture was, Dutch children from the 80s grew up with the translated re-
runs of, for example, Isao Takahata's and Hayao Miyazaki's (among others) Heidi, Girl of the 
Alps (Arupusu no Shōjo Haiji, dir: Isao Takahata, Japan, 1974) and many of us were fans of 
the sad stories of Demetan Croaker, The Boy Frog (Kerokko Demetan, dir: Hiroshi 
Sasagawa, Japan, 1973). In later years, children in the Netherlands became more aware 
that many of the cartoons on Dutch children's television were made in Japan. I remember 
                                                             
40 In Japan, the word 'Otaku' means a young person who is obsessed by Japanese popular culture or- what we in 
the West refer to as a 'nerd' or 'geek'. The word has been adopted by anime fans all over the world and is 
commonly used a reference to anime fans. Many anime fans choose to refer to themselves as otaku, to 
emphasise how much they love the anime and the subculture that has derived from anime. The first generation 
of otaku fans where those who were born between 1955 and 1965 (Lamarre 2009:146). 
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being somewhat confused at first as to which term should be used to refer to 'Japanese 
cartoons'. Anime was called 'manga cartoons' by many Dutch children in the 80s and 90s, 
which was slowly replaced by the commonly used term 'anime'. With the introduction of 
Dragon Ball (Doragon Bōru, dir: Daisuke Nishio, Japan, 1986-1989) and Dragon Ball Z 
(Doragon Bōru Zetto, dir: Daisuke Nishio, Japan, 1989-1996), the first signs of early anime-
fandom where noticeable in the Netherlands. Dragonball was unlike any other cartoon we 
had experienced, and almost immediately after it was broadcast for the first time, became a 
huge hit. Many children (both younger and older) became fans of the series. The success of 
Dragonball  in the Netherlands has been an introduction for many to anime in the 90s and 
might have been the start of modern anime subculture, not only in the Netherlands, but also 
on a global level as series like Dragonball were slowly but surely introduced in the West.  
 After anime became commonly known and broadcast on television, the 
commercialisation of anime fan culture was only a matter of time. The first anime 
convention in the Netherlands was called AnimeCon and was organised in 1999. It has been 
organised each year since. Starting off with about 300 visitors in a small venue in '99, these 
days AnimeCon is already attracting about 18,000 visitors and growing by an additional 
2000 visitors each year. In fact, AnimeCon is becoming so big in the Netherlands that no 
other city other than Rotterdam wants to host the event due the logistic measures that have 
to be taken for the event.41 The demand of anime and fan gatherings of popular culture is 
still growing, hence the fact that an additional event Dutch ComicCon has been organised 
since 2015, attracting about 25,000 visitors during the first edition in 2015 and 
approximately 32,000 in 2018.42 
                                                             
41 As stated in Dutch Newspaper Algemeen Dagblad on 15 June 2018 titled 'AnimeCon is to big for The Hague'. 
42 As stated on Dutch Newswebsite Nu.nl in 2015 and 2018.  
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 What is so attractive about anime that it has created a wide range of fans and even 
a subculture of fans dressing up as their favourite characters (cosplay), attending gatherings 
and communicating with each other via online anime forums? The globalisation of anime 
and anime subculture has in a way created a new, global (and autonomous) identity 
crossing cultural borders and prevailing existing cultural identities. The identity anime-fans 
identify themselves with is not a fixed identity, but a created one. As Chris Barker suggests, 
television (and thus also film) is a major and proliferating resource for the construction of 
cultural identity as it spreads across the globe. It provides a resource and 'material' to be 
further worked on (1999: 7). In the case of anime fandom, the sub-culture that has 
emerged from anime represents a common interest, and has developed a shared, global 
representation of customs associated with anime. As Susan Napier suggests, Japan's soft 
power plays a role here. But anime sub-culture is also highly depended on fan input and 
involvement (2007: 150). Secondly, another element that gives meaning to anime sub-
culture is what Napier refers to as 'subcultural capital': 
 [...] the knowledge and expertise that one gains about the object of one's 
 enthusiasm that allows one not only to feel comfortable with other like-minded fans, 
 but also to gain status among fellow enthusiasts. Often it is this subcultural capital  
 that truly animates and sustains fandom. [...] Subcultural capital is also related to 
 the experiences of pleasure and mastery, [...] in themselves highly active forms  of 
 involvement (ibid: 150). 
Fan gatherings have grown into massive and professionally organised conventions. The 
availability of anime merchandise has grown almost simultaneously too: with the rise of 
anime sub-culture commercialisations of everything anime-related is inevitable. Fandom, 
however, is a multicultural territory (Chen 2007: 14) and my experience of growing up in 
with anime in the Netherlands - although anime has possibly made its entrance in a different 
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pace or timeframe - is similar  to the experiences of adolescents in other regions such as the 
United Stated or even Asia. For example, scholar Jin-Shiow Chen describes fan culture in 
Taiwan from a different, but at the same time similar, perspective. Different, on the one 
hand, because as Chen suggests, anime was once an unaccepted and 'small' undercurrent 
of society (2007: 15). Similar, on the other hand, because nowadays, just like in the 
Netherlands, anime has a huge range of fans who are participating in socio-cultural activities 
and spending money on anime and anime-related products. In that sense, fan culture does 
not necessarily differ solely on the basis of country, but also between the fans themselves. 
The anime fan culture is often described as a 'complete package'; fans read manga, watch 
anime, go to fan gatherings and comic-cons, take part in cosplay events, and so on. 
However, my experience is that, arguably, more than in any other fan- or subculture, there 
are different breakdowns or ‘scenes’ within the anime subculture. For example, one might 
be a fan of watching anime, but not necessarily enjoy going to comic-cons. Or, one might 
enjoy comic-cons, but not be into cosplay at all.  
 When it comes to anime and comic-cons, Taiwan's first comic con was organised in 
1997, only two years before the convention culture (commonly referred to as Con culture) 
made it to the Netherlands. In the United States, the first comic-con conventions already 
date back to the 60s. The first convention that was specifically focussed on Japanese 
cartoons and manga was held in 1983 in Dallas, Texas (Brooker 2014). These massive fan 
gatherings (anime-cons as well as comic-cons, of which anime has become an important 
part) are now held all over the globe, attracting millions of fans each year and cashing in on 
tickets, merchandise, food, and everything else that visitors can relate (even in the slightest) 
to the con-experience and to anime culture.  
 It has become a tradition for many to experience and share interests with fellow fans 
and to find the latest or unique products, hear the latest news from the anime industry and 
perhaps even to meet their favourite characters, directors and/or anime creators. Animecons 
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are often a representation of what visitors perceive as the latest trends in Japanese popular 
culture. There is Japanese food, Japanese pop-bands, 'Kawaii' products. Often traditional 
Japanese culture can be experienced, such as tea ceremonies, sumo wrestling (but with fat 
suits), martial arts workshops, kanji writing workshops, and so on. Napier discusses her 
experiences with comic-cons in the United States, where, as she describes, comic-cons can 
be seen as acting as cultural ambassadors of the Japanese culture (2007: 152), or at least 
are a taste of the Japanese culture. Cons can be an introduction to Japanese culture but at 
the same time are not an 'ideal' representation of what Japanese culture truly is. They are in 
a way a (temporary) cultural phenomenon on their own mixing Japanese traditions with 
Japanese pop-culture and above all, the expectations of anime fans. A place to not only 
meet old friends but also to make new friends, and to enjoy and experience a temporary 
anime world for as long as they are there.  
 In youth culture, it is no surprise that something so unique as an anime (or comic) 
convention attracts teenagers and young adults, each developing their own personality and 
at an age where 'belonging' to a community is an important part of growing up. All the more 
interesting is the foreign and estranged attraction not only of anime but also of the 
Japanese culture. In the essay ‘The Japan Fad in Global Youth Culture’ (2006), Ann Allison 
explains this feeling of feeling estranged (but also intrigued) by comparing the movie Lost in 
Translation (2003) (where two American travellers find each other in Japan because of its 
perceived 'strangeness') to Western youth culture and Japan-oriented fandom. As Allison 
describes, the strangers in the movie are lost in a culture that is both quirky and beautiful, 
very foreign and outside of translations (2006: 11). In a way, this is also what is so 
appealing to anime- and comic-cons. But instead of feeling lost, visitors enjoy embracing 
this feeling of strangeness and quirkiness. What attracts anime fans is 'the feeling of being 
in a place between the phantasmal and real, the foreign and familiar, the strange and every 
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day' (Allison 2006: 16). A place where they have a feeling of being in a fantasy world that is 
both enjoyable and both a subculture they strive to master when it comes to knowledge.  
Anime fandom in China 
Globally, China holds the largest fan community of anime (Fung et al. 2019: 125). Anime 
plays a huge role in Chinese popular culture and is of major influence on the Chinese youth, 
which is striking, since the Chinese government, too, has attempted to create and 'push' 
their own creative industries on domestic markets, but, according to Fung et al. remained 
unsuccessful in the majority of their attempts (ibid: 125). Anime is so big in China that by 
2017 it had already surpassed the Japanese market: sales of anime and anime-related 
products are now higher in China than in Japan (Kodaka and Cho 2017). This too is 
surprising, because in the past years the Chinese government has also attempted to ban 
Japanese content from Chinese television and online sources - often because of the content 
being too extreme for Chinese 'standards'. According to an article in The Japan Times, the 
Chinese government claims that some anime series are a threat to the 'healthy development 
of youth' and encourage criminal activity and violence (anon. 2015).43 For example, as is the 
case with the popular series Attack on Titan (Shingeki no Kyojin, Dir: Tetsurō Araki and 
Masashi Koizuka, Japan, 2013-present) along with 37 other anime productions that were 
banned in 2015 (ibid. 2015). But again, until now this ban has no success either: fans still 
manage to use 'hidden' online sources to access Japanese media instead (Kodaka and Cho 
2017). What is striking is that something that seems so 'innocent' as anime has become a 
subject of political discussion between China and Japan. Whereas Prime Minister Shinzō Abe 
is pushing anime as a soft power, Chinese President Xi Jinping has been the frontrunner in 
China when it comes to banning 'inappropriate' anime from Japan. Not only were these 38 
                                                             




productions banned under his wing, Xi even goes to the extent where he asks Chinese 
media and citizens to reject Japanese vulgarity and promote Chinese artwork instead (The 
Japan Times, 2015).   
 When looking at anime from an economic perspective, there are more factors that 
make the Chinese market different from Western markets. One of them is that China on one 
hand is one of the most important export markets for Japanese popular culture and on the 
other, China has created a huge market of rip-offs and copies of Japanese anime as well. 
For example, the Chinese animation series Astro Plan (Taikong Lixianji, Dir: Xing Yuan, 
China, 2010) has a striking resemblance to Space Battleship Yamato (Uchū Senkan Yamato, 
Dir: Leiji Matsumoto, Japan, 1974-1975) and Mobile Suit Gundam 00 (Kidō Senshi Gandamu 
Daburu Ō, Dir: Seiji Mizushima, Japan, 2007- 2009). However, these copies are often seen 
as mediocre rip-offs by Chinese anime fans who, as studies from Fung et. al. suggest, prefer 
to watch authentic Japanese animation (ibid: 129). Important to note is that it is not just the 
Chinese animation industry that is trying to cash in on 'rip offs' of existing Japanese anime. 
For example, the Korean animation series Super Kid (Dir: Yi Yong Umhas, 1994) has a 







Figure 8,      Figure 9, 
A poster for the Korean movie Superkid.             A poster for the Japanese series Dragonball Z. 
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And of course (although in most cases not plagiarised but with legally bought rights) 
Hollywood has been copying anime and foreign productions for a long time, too. These are 
just a few of the many examples, but show that the growth of anime fandom in China (and 
other surrounding countries) can lead to widespread copying, influencing and plagiarism of 
production companies in order to make more profits. But there are also more positive sides 
to the success of anime in China. It has opened new business opportunities and 
collaborations between Chinese and Japanese businesses and production companies. For 
example, the cross-border film production Legend of the Demon Cat (also known as 'Kukai') 
(Yāo Māo Zhuàn, Dir: Chen Kaige, 2017) is a collaboration between China, Hong Kong and 
Japan (Kodaka and Cho 2017). Furthermore, Chinese anime fandom also results in more 
tourism from China. Research from Kirillova et al. (2018: 268) shows that China is the most 
important market for Japan when it comes to tourism. Anime and otaku subculture is one of 
the most important motivations for Chinese tourists to visit Japan. Building further on the 
research of Kirillova et al., what is even more striking, is that the number of tourists 
travelling from China to Japan has grown almost simultaneously with the growth of anime 
fandom in China. This has even resulted in the rise of Japanese travel agencies that are 
specifically focussing on Chinese anime tourism, offering anime-related tours and 
sightseeing (ibid: 269).  
 It is clear that anime fandom in China is of major importance to the Japanese 
economy. However, with China playing such a big role in the 'boom' of anime, Japan heavily 
depends on China for reaching its fiscal goals of a striking 150% more profits in 2020 
(Nikkei 2017). The political ties between Japan and China still remain fragile, which makes 
the economic goals the Japanese government has in mind for its Chinese markets fragile, 
too. Any political decision or disagreement between the two countries, can result in a more 
aggressive backlash from China in banning Japanese media more or even completely (ibid. 
2017). This would mean that fans would simply have no access to their favourite Japanese 
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products (which of course, is already the case with current censorship policies for some 
anime productions, as discussed in the beginning of this section, but until now fans are still 
able to find a way around this through 'pirate' websites). For example, as a result of political 
tensions in 2012 (when there where massive protests in China against the Japanese 
government buying the Diaoyu Islands) Japanese products were boycotted in China (Yang 
and Xu 2016: 168). Remarkably, everything was boycotted from cars, electrical supplies to 
books, TV drama's and TV shows, but anime and manga still remained available via online 
sources (ibid. 2016). Another recent example from 2019 is the trade war between China and 
the United States: After Trump decided to increase the import tariffs with 10% on Chinese 
goods, China announced to take significant countermeasures. The economy of both 
countries is directly affected by these decisions.  
 Political tensions between Japan and China are not the only thing that makes the 
Chinese market fragile for Japan, but also what distinguishes Chinese from Western fandom. 
Arguably, Chinese fans are more extreme in expressing their fandom than those from 
Western countries . At the same time, Chinese fans often have to deal with criticism from 
family and friends as to why they would even like a product of the 'evil' Japan. As a result of 
Japans and China's wartime past and political relationship, being a fan of Japanese products 
is still somewhat controversial for the older Chinese generation (Yang and Xu 2016: 168)). 
Even with this being the case, cosplay culture, a subculture that has derived from anime, 
games, comic and scifi fandom, is taken to such a serious a level in China that it surpasses 
all other cosplay gatherings around the globe. Cosplay is an art form in itself: fans dress up 
as their favourite character and create the most spectacular outfits. These outfits can be 
bought, but in many cases are created from scratch by the fans themselves. In 2015, about 
one in every ten high school students in China was actively engaged in cosplay (Mackay 
2015). The growth and popularity of the cosplay culture in China has led to the development 
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of the China Cosplay Super Show (CCSS), which is now the largest cosplay competition in 
China.  
 Originally international cosplayers were brought together in a large setting for the 
first time during the World Cosplay Summit which has been held annually in Nagoya, Japan, 
since 2003. The Japanese event consists of photography events and the international World 
Cosplay Championship (WCC). However, the WCC has been facing negativity from fans in 
Japan because of its governmental interference and commercialism (Ruan 2018: 208) 
Furthermore, cosplay competition is generally disliked by many Japanese cosplay fans. The 
way they prefer to participate in cosplay is not to compete with each other, but to bond with 
each other and make photos (2018: 208). Directly deriving from the WCC, various other 
cosplay competitions are now held around the globe, including the China Cosplay Super 
Show. The main difference is that none of them is as strict as the CCSS, where competitors 
are judged on the tiniest details and accuracy (Mackay 2015). Furthermore, both the festival 
that is hosting the competition (the China International Cartoon and Animation Festival, 
CICAF) and CCSS itself are attracting a wide range of international visitors and competitors 
each year. CICAF was organised for the 15th time in 2019 and has become one of the 
largest cartoon and animation festivals in the world (Ruowei 2019). And therefore, it has 
become a serious competitor for the World Cosplay Summit Japan. Not only is the festival 
welcoming worldwide fans, but it also became a place for new international business 
opportunities, including pre-arranged business meetings and discussions for the most 
important international players (ibid. 2019).  
 When it comes to the cosplay show, this is where the line is drawn between amateur 
cosplay and professional cosplay. It might not seem that way with all the kawaii (cute) 
outfits and broad smiles, but the CCSS a very serious event  for competitors.  This brings me 
to how important it is to note that there is a major difference between amateur and 
professional cosplay, especially and foremost in China. For many cosplay fans, participating 
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in cosplay is about the 'fun' and 'play' elements of it (Scott 2015: 146). However, since 
cosplay has been professionalised in China and has become a commercial and competitive 
industry as well, professional competitors often spend loads of money and months of 
training and preparation into their outfits and performance. In that sense, cosplay 
competitions in China have taken on a rather close resemblance to professional top sports. 
Chinese cosplay acts often consist of a large group of staff and team members, in most 
cases employing between 40 and 100 people (ibid. 2019). Each team member plays an 
important role in the success of the performance. There is professional coaching just like in 
a sports team, there are team members that are behind the designs and make-up, those 
who promote the team and of course the team members who are actually performing (Fung 
and Pung 2016: 86). The performance itself is no less than 20 minutes, whereas during the 
WCC in Japan (and most other cosplay competitions outside of China) performances are 
only allowed to be about two and a half minutes long. Another difference is that before 
being allowed on stage in China, a pre-recorded performance has been carefully monitored 
and checked beforehand by government officials (Jacobs 2013: 27). The most famous 
cosplayers have professional marketing campaigns behind them, sell merchandise and have 
a broad range of fans supporting them. Some Chinese cosplayers have become so well know 
that they even have their own range of international fans and are starring in films and TV 
dramas in China and Japan (ibid. 2016). Whilst cosplay is becoming more mainstream in 
Japan, it is certainly taken to a whole new level in China, where achievement and success 
seem to play a larger role in cosplaying than in its originating country Japan. In fact, the 
Chinese cosplay industry has become something entirely different from the Japanese and 
other international cosplay industries, as scholar Li Ruan argues as well: 
 Cosplay in China has developed into something strikingly different from both its 
 Japanese origins and its counterparts in other countries and regions. In China, 
 cosplay communities comprise local and university-based cosplay groups or circles. 
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 They enjoy both the photographic and stage performance elements of cosplay and 
 function at a highly professionalized, commercialized, industrialized, and competitive 
 level. ACG (Anime Comic and Game) fans usually join a cosplay circle if they want to 
 participate in cosplay. In cosplay circles, there is a division of labour according to 
 each cosplayer’s preference and, more importantly, their expertise (Ruan 2018: 210). 
 Another interesting observance of cosplay and especially professional cosplay in 
China, is the amount of 'genderless' characters. The most famous Chinese cosplayers are 
often praised for their androgynous looks and ability to transform into any desired character, 
regardless if the character is an man, woman, or other (Jacobs 2013: 37-38). This 
genderlessness in cosplay might be less of an issue in Western regions of the world, but in 
China, it is remarkable to see that androgyny in cosplay is becoming a trend whilst China on 
the other hand is still commonly known as being conservative on matters of gender (2013: 
26).  Queerness in domestic China is still seen as being socially unacceptable and whilst 
cosplay events are supported by the government, that same government is homophobic 
(until 2001, homosexuality was even officially seen as a mental illness in China). Of course, I 
am not trying to suggest in any way that cosplay events have anything to do with sexual 
orientation (and neither do I suggest that exploring gender identity does, either). But with 
boundaries such as these, it is arguably no surprise that Chinese youth is pushing the limits 
within their cultural norms when it comes to expressing themselves in cosplay. Cosplay 
might be the only accepted way for Chinese youth to experience genderlessness, whilst 
feeling comfortable and accepted in their outfits of desire in a non- binary way,44 as scholar 
Katrien Jacobs points out as well: 
                                                             
44 Not bound to a gender identity, regardless of sexual orientation.  
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 [...] Cosplayers have found ways to comfortably claim and manifest their youth 
 fashions as temporary and tentative outlets that supposedly can be discarded and do 
 not have to lead to a fully queer adulthood (Jacobs 2013: 32).  
Something surprising seems to be going on in China, because whilst China's government has 
been turning more conservative since 2012 (when Xi Jinping became China's leader) (Anon. 
2019)45 gender fluid idols and performers seem to thrive more than ever. As suggested 
before, the Chinese government has been trying to ban any kind of art form and anime that 
does not fit Chinese cultural standards. This includes cross-dressing or any other kind of art 
that challenges conventional gender roles, as suggested by The Economist in 2012. But not 
only does the government support the China Cosplay Super Show, 'regular' cross-dressing 
shows are also becoming commonly more accepted and are more successful than ever, as 
long as they are politically correct. Which basically means that cross-dressing men are 
allowed to perform, as long as they are dressed like traditional Chinese opera stars - and all 
performances are government controlled (ibid. 2012).   
Conclusion  
In previous chapters, I explained the meaning of soft power and how the Japanese 
government is using popular culture as a soft power. Having examined the attractiveness of 
anime-cons, cosplay gatherings and competitions, and the scale in which these gatherings 
have flourished internationally, it is clear that anime-cons, as well as cosplay, can be seen as 
a form of soft power. It might even sound 'silly' that something like a convention can be an 
economic force for a country. But these conventions are an introduction and a business card 
for Japan: it makes consumers all the more interested in Japan as a country, attracted into 
buying more Japanese products, consuming Japanese foods. The next step is visiting Japan 
                                                             
45 According to the article: "Dolled up for the party. Politically correct cross-dressing in China: Drag artists are 
tolerated if they look like Chinese opera stars", The Economist, July 18th, 2019. 
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as a tourist: making a 'pilgrimage' to the Studio Ghibli museum or to Akihabara, the famous 
Japanese district for electronic and 'otaku' products (Kirillova et al. (2018: 268-279) In the 
long run, it may even attract more youth to study in Japan (a variety of organisations 
promoting studying and/ or travelling in Japan are already often to be found at 
conventions), opening new opportunities for business and (academic) co-operations in the 
future.  
 I would like to note that, throughout this chapter as well as this thesis, I refer to 
anime as being a subculture. Building on existing research, news items and media, 
'subculture' is what is commonly used as the term to describe anime culture. However, it is 
evident that anime in Japan and the Western world is becoming more and more common. 
Yet there will always be a difference between anime as a subculture in Japan, and anime 
subculture in the rest of the world. Whereas in Japan this subculture has the potential to 
become more mainstream rather than a subculture due its domestic origins, in the West it 
will always be a subcultural phenomenon. What also becomes clear in this chapter, is that 
anime fandom has been evolving from a 'collective' subculture to a scene in which other 
relatively self-contained subcultures have emerged. Anime subculture has become common 
for a more casual audience in Western regions. Hence, for these regions, arguably, it can be 
best described as a 'mainstream cult'. It is shifting from its subcultural 'cult status' to being 
more mainstream - but is also unable to ever completely become mainstream. According to 
scholar Matt Hills, in situations like these, the 'mainstream' versus the 'cult' seems to be 
intertwined (Hills 2010: 71). According to Hills, the 'mainstream' holds all the aspects of 
widespread distribution, (cultural) reach and popularity, whilst 'cult' is more often perceived 
to be authentic and to have 'hardcore fans' that have created their own subculture (ibid.).  
 The demand of anime and fan gatherings of popular culture is international, and the 
globalisation of anime and anime subculture crossed borders, too. Anime fans share an 
identity, regardless of their cultural or economic background. Thus, the subculture that has 
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emerged from anime represents a common interest all over the globe, but does play a 
somewhat different role in China, where anime 'piracy' (which is in itself a rebellious act 
against the government) is often the only option to watch ones favourite series due 
governmental restrictions. Furthermore, anime subculture in China and therein cosplay 
especially, has become a way to challenge governmental rules, limitations and old-fashioned 
(but dominant) ideologies both of the older generation as the government.  
 At the same time, due to this common worldwide interest, Japan's popular culture is 
shared and represented globally, which makes anime fan culture an interesting economic 
target. This is not only the case for its originating country Japan, but for other countries too, 
such as is also the case with the conventions and cosplay competitions that are organised in 
China, which are attracting a broad range of international visitors each year and are 
boosting the extremely commercial Chinese animation (and cosplay) industry at the same 
time. In the West it is foremost an introduction or a first 'taste' of Japan, resulting in more 
interest from especially the younger generation in Japan as a whole. In the long run, it can 
stimulate more international students coming to Japan, more tourism and of course, more 
money spent on everything anime related - even in the slightest.   
 Con culture is an important part of this: anime and comic-cons are attracting millions 
of fans each year, representing not only the latest trends in Japanese popular culture, but 
also function as an introduction to Japanese culture and tradition. China holds the largest 
fan community of anime in the world, which makes China the most interesting market for 
Japan in economic terms. Anime fandom has resulted in plagiarism but has also opened up 
a broad range of business opportunities for Japan. However, the political relationship 
between China and Japan still remains fragile, which is a risk for Japan. If there is a Chinese 
backlash against Japan, this will have a major economic effect on the animation industry 
(and automatically, will affect all the industries that are directly linked to it, such as anime 
tourism, merchandise etc.) and thus, Japan’s fiscal goals, which are possible but ambitious 
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and highly depended on unchanged economic and political relationships. When it comes to 
Chinese anime fandom, it is still somewhat controversial for the older generation. This is 
striking, because at the same time anime and cosplay are immensely popular among 
Chinese youth. Professional cosplay competition plays a very important role in anime 
fandom and is taken extremely seriously. In China it has developed into to something 
strikingly different from both its Japanese origins and its counterparts in other countries and 
regions. Whilst politically China is becoming more conservative, current youth is doing quite 
the opposite. More teenagers than in any other country are engaging in cosplay. At the 
same time cosplay in China has become a 'safe' way to explore the boundaries of gender 
identity. Arguably, Japanese popular culture has opened a door for Chinese youth to feel 
more free and more able to express themselves, which possibly is the reason why 




Chapter 6. Final conclusions 
Whilst writing this thesis, it was almost impossible to keep up with the pace in which Japan 
worked their way economically through expanding their new 'business model' of cultivating 
popular culture as a soft power. Starting off in 2012, the Cool Japan strategy became a 
political phenomenon. Only a year later, the strategy received governmental funding, which 
led to public as well as political debate, and, as discussed in this thesis, various reports on 
the prospective outcomes by economists and scholars. Since 2015, the scheme led to the 
official governmental funding of anime both on a national and international level. However, 
reports in 2017 state that the strategy lacked discipline, and many projects where failing in 
delivering results (Saito 2017). On top of that, whereas the government is claiming the Cool 
Japan fund to be a 'neutral' party focussed on the growth of Japanese culture, critics argue 
that there is no proof, nor are there any kind of safeguards involved in the funding process 
to assure independence (ibid). Various investments have been made in order to push anime 
as a soft power and to expand overseas anime markets. One of the most recent investments 
in August 2019, according to a Cool Japan Fund Press release (august 2019), was $30 
million U.S. Dollars in the North American Sentai Holdings, an international licensor of 
Japanese anime.  
 Simultaneously, the anime world is one that has not been standing still. International 
co-operations, government funded productions, the yet still-growing anime fan and con- 
culture, all are assets of a market that is so globally loved, and yet at the same time, so 
commercial and now also explicitly political. As I write this conclusion, the 10th anniversary 
of Dutch AnimeCon has just been held in Rotterdam, receiving, according to the website, 
more than 15,000 visitors; the event is still growing tremendously each year. This example 
might be from a Dutch perspective, but does tie in to other international markets where 
anime and Japanese popular culture is a growing trend as well. What becomes clear from 
this research is that, yes, anime can be used as an economic tool and yes, anime is a form 
114 
 
of soft power. In fact, what becomes clear as well, is that it has been a soft power for a long 
time before the government took political and economic interest in anime. Arguably, anime 
might have been more effective as a 'silent' soft power before the government pushed it as 
such. It certainly did not help to maintain the image of anime being an independent art 
form. 'Japanization' is a fact, and the Japanese economy is benefiting from the eagerness of 
international markets to want more of its popular culture, more productions, bigger events, 
more culture: Japan is 'in', even to such an extent that the popular culture of Japan has 
become a subculture in the West. And within that subculture, other subcultures can be 
found, too. 
 At the start of this thesis I stated that Japanese culture is very different from 
Western cultures and therefore is more difficult to access than, for example, American 
culture. However, Japan is succeeding in gaining interest from international countries and 
individuals who are willing to put an effort into learning more about Japan and are 
bedazzled, if not obsessed, by the uniqueness of the Japanese culture and, more 
importantly in this day and age, Japan's popular culture. Youth culture plays a huge role as 
well, as adolescents are at an age where adopting a subculture comes naturally (Allison 
2006: 11). They are the future, and the Japanese government knows very well that 
investing in the younger generation now will benefit the economy in the long run. When it 
comes to the anime market in China, China's youth and young adults have adopted anime 
(and therein cosplay) as a 'mainstream' cult (which, according to scholar Matt Hills happens 
when the 'mainstream' and the 'cult' status regenerate). With governmental restrictions this 
'mainstream' cult has become even bigger than in its domestic Japan and plays a somewhat 
different role in China when compared to Japan and the rest of the world. It makes China 
one of the most flourishing and economically attractive anime markets for Japan, but at the 
same time, also the most fragile one due political instability between Japan and China. 
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 What has become clear, too, is that the Japanese government is mingling in the 
commercial anime market, trying not only to make Japan as culturally attractive as possible 
to foreign markets, but also promoting 'domestic nationalism'. Thus, what this thesis also 
has interrogated is the difference between how the Japanese government wishes to 
represent Japan as a country through 'Cool Japan', and how some anime productions 
represent Japan from an entirely different perspective. For example, in chapter 4 of this 
thesis I have explored the role of neo-nationalism and pacifism in anime, which does not 
always run counter to Japan's political perspectives and ideologies. Anime can be an 
introduction or a metaphorical representation of Japan's wartime past, but at the same time, 
this history exists in different versions in the collective memories of Japanese citizens as well 
as politicians. Therefore, when anime became an official soft power, the government also 
started using popular media to portray nationalism and nation-building. Anime, although 
often national in its content, is not always an accurate representation of the Japanese 
culture. Production companies in Japan have artistic freedom, however, the debate about 
how much of that artistic freedom is still used in some of the government-funded anime is 
still ongoing. When looking at some of the government-funded anime productions, I can 
state that the topic is still questionable. It is a fact that the government is funding 
international co-operations and by doing so, strengthening international economic bonds 
and markets. But it is also a fact that governmental schemes are funding anime productions 
that are produced according to governmental guidelines, glorifying Japan and promoting 
idealism of Japanese history or the military. On the other hand, independent films which 
might not necessarily be beneficial for Japan’s identify (or to be correct, the identity they 
wish to portray) are still being produced, too.  
 During this thesis I have referred to Japanese popular culture as an 'imagined' 
identity. This term, which I am borrowing from scholar Benedict Anderson, characterises 
national identity as an 'imagined' sense of belonging. While exploring fan culture as well as 
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the Japanese identity, trauma and national memory, I have proven that 'imagined' identities 
can indeed become an accepted part of the national and cultural identity. National identity, 
therefore, is not a fixed identity, but can change depending on foreign perceptions as well 
as domestic perceptions, and can be influenced by various sources, such as the government, 
mass media, (international) news and subcultures. National, as well as cultural, identity is 
constantly subject to change. Japan has been - and still is - represented as a culturally 
exclusive and unique culture. However, the subjects that make Japan so unique have 
expanded and shifted immensely with the rise of popular culture, for example, the way 
Japanese culture was seen by foreigners in the 50s and 60s was first and foremost when 
tradition, arts and ceremonies were the main 'known' cultural identity of Japan. In the 80s, 
in addition, Japan was known for its high-end technology and automotive industry. And 
now, it is popular culture that first comes to mind when one thinks or speaks about Japan. 
Anime, manga, cosplay and 'kawaii' culture, are all very different from, for example, tea 
ceremonies, sumo wrestling, or Japanese art. Yet, these perceptions of popular culture have 
become a part of the Japanese culture, just as much as the 'traditional' Japanese references 
are a part of that culture, too.  
 The government has formed the ‘Cool Japan Fund’ and has been trying to financially 
stimulate Japanese cultural goods. Simultaneously, critics have argued that Japan should 
improve their international relationships with other countries in order to grow economically. 
Regardless of the past, Japan still managed to strengthen international bonds with the use 
of popular culture. Arguably, unlike any other country ever did before. The younger 
generation in surrounding Asian countries is more receptive and also more 'forgiving' than 
older generations; they have seemed to embrace Japans popular culture, regardless of the 
past.  
 When discussing the national identity of anime, Shintoism is a huge part of this. The 
religion plays an important role in Japanese culture, landscapes, nature cultivation and 
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national ceremonies. Other important topics are the national memories of history, war and 
the traumas that have derived from the war and the atomic bomb attacks. All these themes 
have been, and still are, popular subjects in anime, but can cause both national and 
international debate: on a scholarly level, among critics, between fans and among other 
spectators. Furthermore, regardless if anime films are transnational (in terms of distribution) 
their context can still be very national. However, this does not keep international spectators 
from viewing (and enjoying) anime productions. On the contrary, it has caused a common 
interest among fans to explore the topics further, discuss topics and themes with other fans- 
and has inspired, like myself, many scholars to research anime in more depth.   
 The attractiveness of anime makes it a very realistic product to use a soft power. It 
is, indeed, an economic force that attracts worldwide consumers to spend more on Japanese 
goods and become more interested in Japan - in, so it seems - a friendly and positive way. 
Whether pushing popular culture (and therein anime) as a major part of a broader, 
economic scheme is enough to shape an economically stable future for Japan remains 
debatable. At least what becomes clear is that anime is not only a moving image, an art 
form, a piece of entertainment, but has also taken on a whole different meaning and formed 
a new layer in Japan's economic history. Anime as an economic weapon and a soft power 
that creates international and commercial opportunities for Japan - and simultaneously, 
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